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2965 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: WHY THE EIGHTH 
AMENDMENT BANS CHARGING 
JUVENILES WITH FELONY MURDER 
Abstract: The intersection of Supreme Court jurisprudence on the Eighth 
Amendment, felony murder, and juvenile justice supports the conclusion that it is 
unconstitutional to charge juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to 
kill with felony murder—a doctrine that allows individuals who unintentionally 
kill while committing a felony to be charged with murder. The Supreme Court 
has acknowledged that juveniles are different from adults because they lack ma-
turity and the ability to understand the consequences of their actions. The felony 
murder doctrine hinges on a defendant’s anticipation of what might occur when 
carrying out a felony; thus, it cannot be applied to juveniles who did not kill, at-
tempt to kill, or intend to kill because juveniles, unlike adults, lack the capacity 
to anticipate negative results from their actions. For example, when juveniles 
burglarize a home, they may not be able to anticipate that the situation could es-
calate and result in the physical harm, or even death, of the homeowner. This 
Note will argue that it is unconstitutional to charge juveniles who did not kill, at-
tempt to kill, or intend to kill with felony murder because the Eighth Amend-
ment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause requires defendants to be morally 
culpable in order to face criminal liability. Juveniles who did not kill, intend to 
kill, or attempt to kill lack the requisite moral culpability to be charged with felo-
ny murder. 
INTRODUCTION 
In March 2003, when Ryan Holle was twenty years old, he hosted a party 
that continued into the early morning.1 After the party, Holle lent his car to a 
friend—which he frequently did—believing that the friend was going to get 
food.2 Instead, while Holle remained at the house, his friend and three others 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Adam Liptak, Serving Life for Providing Car to Killers, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2007), https://
www.nytimes.com/2007/12/04/us/04felony.html [https://perma.cc/RA9Q-NBEY]. Holle, his sister, 
and their roommate, Billy Allen, hosted a party at the home they shared in Pensacola, Florida. Amy 
Dosh, Exclusive: Ryan Holle, Convicted for Lending Car in Robbery-Murder, Discusses Case, TRUE 
CRIME DAILY (June 8, 2017), https://truecrimedaily.com/2017/06/08/exclusive-ryan-holle-convicted-
for-lending-car-in-robbery-murder-discusses-case/ [https://perma.cc/EWE4-3P5G]. Holle estimated 
that he had six to ten drinks during the party before going to bed while the party continued. Id. 
 2 Liptak, supra note 1. At around 7:00 AM, Allen woke up Holle to ask to borrow Holle’s car. 
Dosh, supra note 1. Holle said yes. Id. Holle, who was half-asleep and still feeling the effects of the 
alcohol he consumed the night before, overheard Allen speaking with three strangers about commit-
ting a burglary at the home of Allen’s on-again-off-again girlfriend, Jessica Snyder. Id. Allen believed 
that Snyder’s mother kept a safe in her house with $20,000 inside. Id. Holle also overhead the men 
agree that they might need to knock out Jessica to carry out their plot. Id. Holle maintains that he was 
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took Holle’s car to carry out a burglary.3 During the burglary, the men killed 
the homeowner’s daughter.4 Holle admitted to police that he heard his friend 
and the other men talking about committing a robbery, but maintained that he 
did not take the conversation seriously and truly believed his friend was going 
to get food.5 Holle, along with the other four men, was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to life in prison.6 During Holle’s trial, the prose-
cutor reiterated that without the car, no crime could have occurred and the vic-
tim would still be alive.7 Holle is still in prison today, though in 2015, Florida 
                                                                                                                           
in absolute disbelief that his roommate would commit a burglary, especially against his own girlfriend. 
Id. He instead assumed that the men would use his car to get food, which Holle also had heard them 
discuss, and then fell back asleep. Id. 
 3 Liptak, supra note 1. Allen and the other men expected that only Snyder would be home, but her 
little sister was at the house as well. Dosh, supra note 1. They waited for her to leave for school and 
then went forward with the burglary. Id. Allen stayed in the car while the other men went inside. Id. 
 4 Liptak, supra note 1. When they were met with resistance from Snyder, one of the men, Charles 
Miller, brutally beat Snyder with the butt of a shotgun until her skull was smashed in. Dosh, supra 
note 1. It was not long after the men returned to Holle’s home with the safe that the police arrived. Id. 
Holle fully cooperated with police believing that he was innocent of any wrongdoing. Id. He went to 
the station and provided his account of what had occurred. Id. 
 5 Liptak, supra note 1. Holle’s roommate, Billy Allen, expressed in a pretrial deposition that 
Holle’s only involvement in the crime was telling Allen that he could use his car. Id. Holle blames his 
naivety and impairment for not recognizing the seriousness of his friend’s intention to commit rob-
bery. Id. Holle’s admission that he heard the men discussing the robbery solidified the prosecution’s 
case against him. Id. The prosecution needed to prove that Holle intended to assist in the commission 
of the robbery, and the jury could interpret Holle’s admission that he overheard the plan and lent his 
car anyway as intent to assist in the burglary. Dosh, supra note 1. 
 6 Liptak, supra note 1. The other four men involved in the crime also received sentences of life 
without parole, even though only one of them actually had committed the killing, while two of the 
men were in the home and one was waiting in the car. Id. Because of his diminished culpability, Holle 
was the only one of the group to be offered a plea deal, which he rejected, because he thought he 
would be found not guilty at trial. Dosh, supra note 1. His trial lasted only one day. Id. The jury found 
Holle guilty of first-degree felony murder, robbery with a firearm, and burglary of an occupied dwell-
ing with assault or battery. Holle v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 3:11cv436/LAC/EMT, 2012 WL 
2885527, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 2884947 
(N.D. Fla. July 13, 2012). Holle was sentenced to life in prison without parole for the first-degree 
murder charge and thirteen years for the robbery and burglary charges to be served concurrently with 
the murder sentence. Id. at *1–2. Holle’s appeals in both state and federal court were denied. Id. at 
*1–2, *5. In 2015, Holle’s sentence was commuted to twenty-five years in prison and ten years on 
probation by then-Florida Governor Rick Scott. Jeremy Wallace, Governor and Cabinet Cut Prison 
Sentence for Two in Rare Clemency Action, TAMPA BAY TIMES (June 24, 2015), https://www.tampa
bay.com/news/governor-and-cabinet-cut-prison-sentences-for-two-in-rare-clemency-action/2234892/ 
[https://perma.cc/TZV2-P3JT]. Governor Scott expressed that Holle was still culpable for the death of 
the victim, but that he was less culpable than the actual perpetrator and thus his sentence should reflect 
that. Id. 
 7 Liptak, supra note 1. Twelve years after the crime, at Holle’s clemency hearing, Florida’s At-
torney General argued in favor of maintaining Holle’s life sentence, claiming that Holle knew Snyder 
would be beaten to death and wanted the men to carry out the “dirty work.” Dosh, supra note 1. At the 
same hearing, Snyder’s father compared Holle to Charles Manson, the infamous cult leader who au-
thorities suspect facilitated thirty-five murders. Id.; Charles Manson Biography (1934–2017), BIOG-
RAPHY (last updated Sept. 1, 2020), https://www.biography.com/crime-figure/charles-manson [https://
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Governor Rick Scott commuted Holle’s life sentence to twenty-five years with 
ten years of probation.8 Holle is scheduled to be released in 2024, at which 
point he will have spent twenty-one years and three months in prison.9 
Opinions differ on whether someone like Holle, who was one-and-a-half 
miles away from the crime scene and did not plan or commit the robbery or 
murder, deserved to spend the rest of his life in prison.10 Yet, the felony murder 
rule legally justifies Holle’s original sentence.11 The felony murder rule, at its 
most extreme, classifies any death that occurs during the commission of a dan-
gerous felony as murder, regardless of whether the death was intentionally 
caused.12 Further, because of the broad scope of accomplice liability, any ac-
                                                                                                                           
perma.cc/4BQK-6Y9N]. The prosecutor who handled Holle’s case maintained that he did not regret 
pursuing such a harsh charge against Holle because Holle rejected his plea offer. Dosh, supra note 1. 
 8 Wallace, supra note 6. The power to commute sentences tends to be used sparingly. Id. Holle’s 
sentence was one of only three commuted by Governor Scott within a five-year period. Id. In compar-
ison, former Florida Governor Jeb Bush commuted twenty-two sentences during his eight year term as 
governor. Id. 
 9 Dosh, supra note 1. Holle stated that the clemency outcome was bittersweet. Id. Although he 
was relieved he would not die in prison, Holle still felt he should not have ended up there at all. Id. 
 10 See Liptak, supra note 1 (outlining the different positions of members of the legal community 
on whether the felony murder rule is justified in cases where the defendant did not kill or intend to 
kill). England, India, and other common-law countries where modern criminal law focuses on holding 
individuals accountable for only their own actions have outlawed the felony murder rule. Id. In the 
United States, however, many prosecutors and victims’ rights groups believe that people assume the 
risk of causing a death when they decide to participate in certain dangerous crimes, even if those indi-
viduals do not personally cause the death. Id. 
 11 See Liptak, supra note 1 (citing the prosecutor’s statement to the jury explaining that Holle 
must be treated the same as the other individuals who were actually involved in the robbery). 
 12 Felony Murder Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). In the early nineteenth cen-
tury, states started creating statutes that treated killings committed during the course of a felony, 
whether intentional or not, as murder as long as the felony involved an assault or otherwise significant 
risk of death. Emily C. Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in 
the Wake of Roper, Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 304 (2012). In the 1950s, many 
states further expanded their felony murder statutes to include unintentional killings that occurred 
during felonies when the death was reasonably foreseeable. Id. The vast majority of states employ 
some form of the felony murder doctrine. PAUL H. ROBINSON & TYLER SCOT WILLIAMS, MAPPING 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW VARIATIONS ACROSS THE 50 STATES: CH. 5 FELONY-MURDER RULE 2 
(Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law ed., 2017), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/
1719 [https://perma.cc/R6FA-6JSR]. Eight states either do not have felony murder or have a version 
of the rule that requires the government to prove the level of culpability needed for murder. Id. (noting 
that as of January 2017, seven states essentially did not have felony murder statutes); see Patrick 
Johnson, SJC Ruling Narrows Massachusetts Definition of Felony Murder, MASSLIVE (Sept. 20, 
2017), https://www.masslive.com/news/2017/09/sjc_ruling_in_woburn_murder_co.html [https://
perma.cc/2ESK-2YNV] (explaining that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held in September 
2017 that people can be charged with felony murder only if one of the mental states necessary to be 
guilty of murder is proven). In proving that a defendant is guilty of felony murder, two states require 
the government to prove that the defendant was reckless in causing the killing, fourteen states require 
the government to prove some form of carelessness on the part of the defendant, and twenty-six states 
and the District of Columbia require no culpability on behalf of the defendant. See ROBINSON & WIL-
LIAMS, supra, at 3–6 (noting that as of January 2017, twenty-seven states required no culpability on 
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complice to the underlying felony can be charged with murder even if the ac-
complice did not contribute to the killing.13 
Holle was twenty years old at the time of the crime, but much younger 
individuals have been convicted under similar circumstances.14 Many states do 
not record which murder convictions were obtained under a felony murder 
theory, making it difficult to determine the number of people currently serving 
sentences for felony murder.15 Criminal justice advocates nevertheless main-
tain that the felony murder rule disproportionately impacts women and juve-
niles.16 Juveniles, in particular, are more likely to participate in group crimes 
and are more vulnerable to the pressure of peers, making them more likely to 
engage in behavior that could result in a felony murder charge.17 The punish-
ment for felony murder varies by state, with some states permitting sentences 
as harsh as the death penalty or life without parole.18 Although a felony murder 
conviction has enormous implications for anyone, the convictions are especial-
ly catastrophic for juveniles who, due to their immaturity and lack of foresight, 
could spend their entire adult life in prison.19 
                                                                                                                           
behalf of the defendant, including Massachusetts, which started requiring proof of mens rea in Sep-
tember 2017). 
 13 Felony Murder Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12. Accomplices are individuals 
who come together to perpetrate a crime. Accomplice, id. Participating in a crime in any way makes a 
person an accomplice to that crime. Id. As in the case of Ryan Holle, accomplice liability can apply to 
anyone who assists in the commission of a crime, even if the assistance is minimal. Liptak, supra note 1. 
 14 Liptak, supra note 1. For example, at the age of fifteen, Justin Doyle and two friends attempted 
to burglarize a home that they thought was empty. Duaa Eldeib, Man Jailed at 15 Under Controver-
sial Felony Murder Rule Receives Commuted Sentence, CHI. TRIB. (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.
chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-justin-doyle-felony-murder-released-met-20170423-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/LH95-ENKH]. The boys were unarmed, but Doyle’s accomplice and friend, who 
was fourteen at the time, ended up dead when a startled resident fired at the intruders. Id. Doyle was 
charged with the murder of his friend, but ended up pleading to a thirty-year sentence. Id. Doyle 
served nine years before his sentence was commuted to time served by Illinois Governor Bruce 
Rauner. Id.  
 15 Punished for Another’s Crime: The Felony-Murder Rule, RESTORE JUST. ILL., https://restore
justiceillinois.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/HB1615-Fact-Sheet_-Felony-Murder-2.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8VCU-EJVR]. 
 16 See Abbie VanSickle, If He Didn’t Kill Anyone, Why Is It Murder?, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/us/california-felony-murder.html [https://perma.cc/
76MB-LWDD] (citing to a survey conducted of one thousand people who had been convicted of mur-
der that found that women and juveniles were disproportionately impacted by felony murder). 
 17 Punished for Another’s Crime: The Felony-Murder Rule, supra note 15. Notably, the Supreme 
Court has held that the death penalty and mandatory life without parole are unconstitutional when 
applied to juveniles. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 
578–79 (2005). For a discussion of the significance of these Supreme Court decisions, see infra notes 
103–142 and accompanying text. 
 18 See Punished for Another’s Crime: The Felony-Murder Rule, supra note 15 (stating that the 
sentence for felony murder in Illinois ranges from twenty years to life). 
 19 Felony Murder in Illinois, RESTORE JUST., https://restorejustice.org/issues-solutions/felony-
murder/ [https://perma.cc/LW8N-RK6M] (explaining that even though the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that juveniles are particularly reckless and impulsive, the system still treats them the 
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The recent push for criminal justice reform, coupled with recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence addressing the constitutionality of certain punishments as 
applied to juveniles, has made felony murder for juveniles a topic of national 
debate.20 On the one hand, the rule seems difficult to justify in light of recent 
Supreme Court decisions acknowledging that juveniles should not be held to 
the same standards as adults because of their immaturity, susceptibility to peer 
pressure, and capacity for reform.21 On the other hand, people, including juve-
niles, must be held accountable for the unintended consequences of risky and 
illicit actions.22 
This Note explores whether the felony murder rule is constitutional as ap-
plied to juveniles.23 There are multiple ways to challenge felony murder for 
juveniles, yet so far none have succeeded in court or gained widespread sup-
port among scholars.24 This Note outlines three arguments challenging the ap-
plication of felony murder to juveniles and analyzes which argument has the 
best chance at success.25 Part I explains the intersection of felony murder, the 
Eighth Amendment, and juvenile justice Supreme Court precedent.26 Part II 
explores three arguments that attack the constitutionality of charging juveniles 
with felony murder.27 Part III argues that charging juveniles who did not kill, 
attempt to kill, or intend to kill with felony murder is unconstitutional because 
                                                                                                                           
same as adults when they are charged with felony murder, meaning they can face life in prison and are 
permanently considered to be violent). 
 20 See Liptak, supra note 1 (highlighting that although some find the felony murder rule to be 
“draconian,” others, including the prosecutor and family of the victim in Ryan Holle’s case, firmly 
believe that all participants in violent felonies must be held accountable for any harm resulting from 
their actions). Advocates across the country argue that prosecutors should not charge juveniles with felo-
ny murder. See Cheryl Corley, Juvenile Justice Groups Say Felony Murder Charges Harm Children, 
Young Adults, NPR (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/11/14/778537103/juvenile-justice-
groups-say-felony-murder-charges-harm-children-young-adults [https://perma.cc/V7BE-ARE2] (quot-
ing Marsha Levick, co-founder of the Juvenile Law Center, explaining that youths’ developmental 
differences from adults makes it unfair for them to be charged with felony murder). Judge George W. 
Timberlake, a retired Chief Judge of Illinois’ Second Judicial Circuit, advocates that prosecutors 
should not charge juveniles in Illinois with felony murder and, instead, should punish juveniles more 
harshly for the underlying felony committed, if a death occurs. George Timberlake, Felony Murder 
Rule Should Not Apply to Juveniles in Illinois, JUV. JUST. INFO. EXCHANGE (Mar. 10, 2016), https://
jjie.org/2016/03/10/felony-murder-rule-should-not-apply-to-juveniles-in-illinois/ [https://perma.cc/
ZPP3-A2WT]. 
 21 See Felony Murder in Illinois, supra note 19 (noting that the Supreme Court has acknowledged 
that juveniles are reckless and impulsive, making it especially harsh to punish them with life in prison 
for felony murder). 
 22 See Liptak, supra note 1 (explaining that the father of the victim in Holle’s case felt strongly 
that Holle was just as responsible for his daughter’s death as Holle’s friend, who had beaten her to 
death, because she would still be alive if Holle had not lent the perpetrators his car). 
 23 See infra Part I. 
 24 See infra Part III. 
 25 See infra Part III.  
 26 See infra Part I. 
 27 See infra Part II. 
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it is at odds with the Supreme Court’s doctrine on juvenile justice and the 
Eighth Amendment.28 
I. EIGHTH AMENDMENT, FELONY MURDER, AND JUVENILE  
JUSTICE SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE 
The constitutionality of charging juveniles with felony murder implicates 
three lines of Supreme Court precedent: (1) Eighth Amendment, (2) felony 
murder, and (3) juvenile justice.29 Connecting these distinct areas of the law is 
the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments, which in-
forms the Court’s felony murder and juvenile sentencing precedent.30 Section 
A of this Part discusses the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurispru-
dence.31 Section B of this Part then outlines the history and modern application 
of the felony murder doctrine.32 Finally, Section C of this Part summarizes re-
cent developments in juvenile justice.33 
A. The Eighth Amendment’s Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prohibits the government 
from demanding excessive bail or fines, and from inflicting cruel and unusual 
punishments.34 The amendment addressed fears that the federal government 
would abuse its power under the Constitution to create and prosecute crimes.35 
Since the amendment passed in 1791, jurists have debated the meaning of its 
ban on cruel and unusual punishments.36 
Although the scope of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause re-
mains hotly debated, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that the amend-
ment imposes three categories of limitations on the government’s ability to 
create and punish crimes.37 First, it limits the types of punishments that the 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra Part III. 
 29 See infra Part I.A; Part I.B; Part I.C. 
 30 See id. Part I.A; Part I.B; Part I.C. 
 31 See infra Part I.A. 
 32 See infra Part I.B. 
 33 See infra Part I.C. 
 34 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Bryan A. Stevenson & John F. Stinneford, The Eighth Amendment, 
INTERACTIVE CONSTITUTION (last visited Jan. 7, 2020), https://constitutioncenter.org/interactive-
constitution/interpretation/amendment-viii/clauses/103 [https://perma.cc/9ZLP-BJDZ] (explaining that 
the Constitution did not originally contain this ban, and that it was incorporated as part of the Bill of 
Rights after the Constitution was ratified). 
 35 See Stevenson & Stinneford, supra note 34 (noting that the Constitution significantly increased 
the power of the federal government compared to the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution’s 
predecessor, which had created anxieties that the government would abuse its power). 
 36 See id. 
 37 See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667 (1977) (explaining that the Court has interpreted 
the Eighth Amendment to limit (1) the types of punishments that can be inflicted for criminal conduct, 
(2) the imposition of punishments that are disproportionate to the charged conduct, and (3) the type of 
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government may inflict upon someone that is convicted of a crime.38 There is 
little dispute over whether the Eighth Amendment bans inhumane forms of 
punishment, such as torture, and the Supreme Court has stated explicitly that 
the Eighth Amendment bans any punishment that inflicts unnecessary and de-
liberate pain.39 The Court also has banned certain non-physical punishments as 
cruel and unusual.40 For example, in 1958, in Trop v. Dulles, the Court ada-
mantly rejected denationalization as a form of punishment.41 The Supreme 
Court reasoned that the revocation of a person’s citizenship had the effect of 
excluding that person from society, which the Court held to be even more cruel 
than physical torture.42 
                                                                                                                           
behavior that can be made criminal); Stevenson & Stinneford, supra note 34 (stating that there is uni-
versal agreement that the Eighth Amendment bans the infliction of barbaric punishments, but there is 
disagreement over what standard should be used to determine whether a punishment is cruel and unu-
sual, whether disproportionate sentences are cruel and unusual, and whether the death penalty is cruel 
and unusual, among other things); supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining different theories 
regarding felony murder and the Eighth Amendment). 
 38 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667. The Supreme Court has ruled that the Eighth Amendment bans 
both incarceration without medical care and expatriation for desertion. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 
U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (holding that because failing to provide inmates with medical care could cause 
pain and suffering, the government must provide it); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (holding 
that denationalization as punishment violates the Eighth Amendment because it is even more evil than 
physical torture given that it completely eliminates the criminal’s position in society). 
 39 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (explaining that in order to be constitutional, a 
punishment “must not involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”); Stevenson & 
Stinneford, supra note 34 (explaining that it is widely accepted that the Eighth Amendment “prohibits 
‘barbaric’ methods of punishment” and that the use of “the rack, or thumbscrews, or gibbets as in-
struments of punishment” would clearly violate the Constitution). At the Massachusetts Ratifying 
Convention in 1788, convention participant Abraham Holmes expressed his concern over the lack of 
safeguards against the types of punishments the federal government could inflict. See Abraham 
Holmes, Speech to the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention for the United States Constitution (Jan. 
30, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, 
at 111 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co. 2d ed. 1881) (“They are nowhere 
restrained from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments, and annexing them to crimes; 
and there is no constitutional check on them, but that racks and gibbets may be amongst the most mild 
instruments of their discipline.”). 
 40 See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101 (holding that certain non-physical punishments, like denationaliza-
tion, can violate the Eighth Amendment). 
 41 Id. The defendant in Trop was convicted of desertion after he escaped from his Army post in 
Casablanca in 1944. Id. at 87. He was sentenced to “three years at hard labor” and dishonorably dis-
charged from the Army. Id. at 88. When the defendant applied for a passport in 1952, he was informed 
that his citizenship had been revoked because of his desertion conviction and dishonorable discharge. 
Id. As a result, his passport application was denied. Id. 
 42 See id. at 102 (stating that stripping a citizen of his or her citizenship is “offensive to cardinal 
principles for which the Constitution stands” because it “subjects the individual to a fate of ever-
increasing fear and distress”). Despite the Court’s rejection of the revocation of citizenship as a form 
of punishment in Trop, current criminal law allows for serious immigration consequences, like depor-
tation, for green card holders and other noncitizens that have been convicted of crimes. See SARAH 
HERMAN PECK & HILLEL R. SMITH, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY, CONG. 
RES. SERV. 5–6 (2018) (listing criminal convictions for which non-citizens may be removed from the 
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Second, the Court has held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments 
Clause forbids punishments that are egregiously harsh when compared to the 
nature of the crime committed.43 This restraint, referred to as the proportionali-
ty requirement, emerged from Justice Stephen Johnson Field’s 1892 dissent in 
O’Neil v. Vermont.44 In O’Neil, the Court sentenced the defendant to fifty-four 
years of hard labor for distributing intoxicating liquors.45 Justice Field dissent-
ed, arguing that the sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it ex-
ceeded the length of any sentence the defendant could have received for far 
more serious crimes, such as burglary, robbery, or manslaughter.46 Justice Field 
reasoned that because the Eighth Amendment bans the imposition of dispro-
portionate bail and fines, its ban on cruel and unusual punishments must also 
prohibit disproportionate punishments.47 In 1910, in Weems v. United States, 
the Court adopted Justice Field’s view of the Eighth Amendment’s proportion-
ality requirement, holding that it was cruel and unusual to sentence a defendant 
who had falsified an official document to fifteen years of hard labor in pris-
                                                                                                                           
United States). The Court also has opined on whether the death penalty is a permissible punishment 
for someone found guilty of a crime under the Eighth Amendment, but that topic is beyond the scope 
of this Note. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (stating that the death penalty cannot be challenged on Eighth 
Amendment grounds until it is no longer approved of throughout society). 
 43 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667. The Court held that it was cruel and unusual to sentence a de-
fendant who had falsified an official document to fifteen years in prison in addition to other penalties. 
See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 380–81 (1910) (reasoning that other, more severe crimes, 
such as certain degrees of homicide and misprision of treason, carry shorter sentences than the de-
fendant’s sentence for falsifying documents). Additionally, the Court has held that it is cruel and unu-
sual to make an individual’s status a crime. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) 
(holding that the state of California violated the Eighth Amendment when it criminalized the status of 
being addicted to narcotics). 
 44 O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). 
 45 Id. at 330 (majority opinion). In O’Neil, the Supreme Court found the defendant guilty of 307 
counts of selling intoxicating liquor and ordered him to pay a fine of $6,638. Id. In addition, the de-
fendant was also sentenced to one month of confinement. Id. If the defendant failed to pay the fine 
before the end of the month, however, he would be required to serve three days in confinement for 
every dollar owed, or 19,914 days. Id. The defendant appealed the sentence claiming that it was cruel 
and unusual, but the Court upheld the sentence. Id. 
 46 Id. at 339–40 (Field, J., dissenting). The defendant’s sentence was “six times as great as any 
court in Vermont could have imposed for manslaughter, forgery or perjury.” Id. at 339. The majority 
declined to rule on whether the punishment was cruel and unusual because the Eighth Amendment did 
not apply to the states in 1892 and therefore there was no federal question. Id. at 331–32 (majority 
opinion). Still, the Court noted that the Supreme Court of Vermont had found that the defendant’s 
sentence was not excessive because the defendant committed the offense of selling intoxicating liquor 
on 307 occasions. Id. at 331. The Court reasoned that a person who repeatedly commits a crime can-
not then claim that the sentence is unconstitutional because of its length. Id. 
 47 Id. at 339–40 (Field, J., dissenting). Justice Field reasoned that the only way to assess whether 
bail or a fine is excessive, as neither involves barbaric physical punishment, is to determine whether 
the amount of the bail or fine is reasonable in comparison to the behavior charged. See id. The fact 
that such analysis is required by the Eighth Amendment demonstrates that sentences that are dispro-
portionate to the crime are unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. See id. 
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on.48 Since Weems, the Court has continued to apply the proportionality re-
quirement, although some Justices disagree with Field’s interpretation because 
the proportionality requirement is not explicitly stated in the language of the 
Eighth Amendment.49 
Third, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause places limitations on 
the type of behavior that can be labeled and punished as criminal.50 In 1962, in 
Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court held that a California statute, which 
made it a crime for individuals to “be addicted to the use of narcotics,” was 
unconstitutional.51 The Court took issue with the statute in Robinson because a 
person could be found guilty under the statute without proof of actual narcotics 
use.52 The Court determined that being addicted to narcotics was a chronic 
condition that existed after the act of using drugs was complete and persisted 
until the individual successfully recovered from addiction.53 As a result, people 
struggling with addiction were vulnerable to arrest for merely living with their 
addiction.54 The Court classified addiction as an affliction that could be con-
tracted “innocently and involuntarily,” and compared addicts to people who 
live with leprosy, sexually transmitted diseases, or mental illnesses.55 Further-
                                                                                                                           
 48 Weems, 217 U.S. at 357, 381. In Weems, the defendant was a disbursement officer in the Phil-
ippine Islands. Id. at 357. He was charged with falsifying government documents when he recorded 
that wages of 208 and 408 pesos had been paid out to employees when they had not. Id. at 362–63. 
The lower court did not require that the government prove that the falsification was intentional or 
carried out maliciously, only that an incorrect entry existed. Id. at 363. 
 49 See John F. Stinneford, Against Cruel Innovation: The Original Meaning of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, and Why It Matters Today, INTERACTIVE CONST., https://constitution
center.org/interactive-constitution/interpretation/amendment-viii/clauses/103#against-cruel-innovation-
the-original-meaning-of-the-cruel-and-unusual-puni [https://perma.cc/MT66-XY9T] [hereinafter 
Against Cruel Innovation] (explaining that Justices who subscribe to originalism, such as Justices 
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, believe that the Eighth Amendment only bans barbaric punish-
ments and thus punishing a parking ticket with life in prison would be constitutional); see also Miller, 
567 U.S. at 503–04 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Clause does not contain a ‘proportionality princi-
ple.’”). 
 50 See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 667 (listing Robinson v. California as a case in which the Court 
limited the type of behavior that the government can deem criminal). 
 51 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 660 n.1, 667 (quoting CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11721) 
(West 1962)) (“No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be addicted to the use of narcot-
ics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a person licensed by the State to pre-
scribe and administer narcotics.”). 
 52 See id. at 663 (explaining that the trial judge in Robinson instructed the jury that the defendant 
could be convicted if the jury found that he used illegal narcotics or was addicted to using them). 
 53 Id. at 666. The American Society of Addiction Medicine defines addiction as a chronic medical 
disease in which people compulsively use substances despite the negative consequences. Definition of 
Addiction, AM. SOC’Y OF ADDICTION MED. (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.asam.org/docs/default-
source/quality-science/asam’s-2019-definition-of-addiction-(1).pdf?sfvrsn=b8b64fc2_2 [https://
perma.cc/HRX3-ZLWP]. 
 54 See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (reasoning that a person could be arrested for entering the state 
of California as an addict, even if the person had not bought, sold, or taken any drugs while in the 
state). 
 55 Id. 
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more, the Court rooted its reasoning in the insanity defense’s rationale, holding 
that addicts, like the mentally ill, are not “responsible moral agents.”56 
In the years since Robinson, the Court has not expanded upon the culpa-
bility requirement articulated in its opinion.57 Nonetheless, it has implied that a 
statute that punishes in the absence of fault may be unconstitutional.58 Addi-
tionally, the Court continues to acknowledge the importance of culpability in 
its rulings, particularly with respect to cases of murder.59 
B. The Felony Murder Doctrine 
Scholars have criticized and debated the constitutionality of the felony 
murder doctrine for decades because it allows defendants to be punished for a 
harm they did not intend to inflict.60 The doctrine allows prosecutors to charge 
individuals and their accomplices with murder when a killing occurs during the 
course of a felony, regardless of whether they intended to kill.61 Legal scholars 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See John F. Stinneford, Punishment Without Culpability, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 
687 (2012) [hereinafter Punishment Without Culpability] (interpreting Robinson to mean that it is 
unconstitutional to impose a punishment on a defendant who lacks culpability). The Court’s reasoning 
was rooted in the principles behind the insanity defense: it asserted that addicts “are not responsible 
moral agents.” Id. Because addiction did not fit the criteria of legal insanity, the Court relied on lack 
of culpability to invalidate the statute. Id. 
 57 See id. at 702 (noting that although Robinson has not been overturned, the Court has refrained 
from continuing to uphold culpability as a constitutional principle). 
 58 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 71–72 (1994) (relying on 
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250 (1952), and subsequent decisions to conclude that a 
statute without an explicit mens rea requirement nonetheless contained one); United States v. Int’l 
Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 564 (1971) (reiterating the “universal and persistent” princi-
ple, articulated in Morissette, that a harm only constitutes a crime when it has been inflicted intention-
ally). 
 59 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the 
idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, 
the more severely it ought to be punished.”). 
 60 See Guyora Binder, The Origins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59, 60 
(2004) [hereinafter Binder, Origins] (explaining that scholars criticize felony murder because it makes 
the crime of murder, which otherwise requires that a killing be carried out with some degree of ma-
lintent, a strict liability crime); see also Guyora Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 403, 410 (2011) [hereinafter Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder] (arguing that because 
the felony murder doctrine seems to be here to stay, scholars and practitioners should at least advocate 
for the best possible application of the rule); Charles Liebert Crum, Causal Relations and the Felony-
Murder Rule, 1952 WASH. U. L.Q. 191, 209–10 (1952) (arguing that the felony murder rule should be 
changed so that evidence of a killing resulting from a felony implies an intent to kill, but does not 
prove it); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional 
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 448 (1985) (arguing that the felony murder rule is unconstitu-
tional because it does not require the government to prove the defendant’s mens rea to commit murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt).  
 61 Felony Murder Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12. Felony murder is controver-
sial because it is a strict liability crime. Binder, Origins, supra note 60, at 60. Strict liability crimes are 
those that do not require any intent to do harm. Strict Liability Crime, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 
supra note 12. For example, statutory rape is one of the longest recognized strict liability crimes and, 
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first articulated the concept of felony murder in the early eighteenth century, alt-
hough felony murder did not become law in the United States until the nine-
teenth century.62 When states began codifying their respective murder statutes in 
the nineteenth century, felony murder statutes emerged as a way of increasing 
the culpability of individuals who caused a death while attempting to inflict inju-
ry.63 By the 1950s, states began expanding their felony murder statutes, classify-
ing felony murder as any killing that occurred during the commission of a felo-
ny, as long as the possibility of death was reasonably foreseeable.64 
The rationale behind the felony murder rule is based on the idea that peo-
ple who negligently cause a death are more culpable if they do so in further-
ance of a felony.65 For example, without the felony murder rule, if A tortured B 
and C and ended up killing them, A could not be convicted of murder unless A 
had intentionally or recklessly killed B and C.66 Felony murder statutes reflect 
                                                                                                                           
to be found guilty, the government need not prove that the defendant knew the victim was underage. 
W. Robert Thomas, On Strict Liability Crimes: Preserving a Moral Framework for Criminal Intent in 
an Intent-Free Moral World, 110 MICH. L. REV. 647, 650 (2012). Strict liability crimes hold individu-
als accountable for the outcome of their actions, regardless of whether they intended for those out-
comes to occur as a result of their conduct. Punishment Without Culpability, supra note 56, at 684. 
Most criminal conduct requires individuals’ actions to match their mental state. Id. at 684 n.158. 
 62 See Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, supra note 60, at 413–14 (explaining that Chief 
Justice Holt proposed the concept of felony murder in Rex v. Plummer in 1700 and that William Haw-
kins also endorsed the idea in his treatise written in 1716). In his 1718 treatise, William Hawkins 
argued that killings that resulted from a felony should be classified as murder. Id. at 414. Hawkins 
believed that all felonies, which at the time included “murder, manslaughter, rape, burglary, arson, 
robbery, theft, and mayhem,” were of an inherently violent nature because they could result in retalia-
tion. Id. William Blackstone also stated that unintended deaths resulting during the commission of a 
felony constituted murder. Id. It is unlikely, however, that he meant for this to apply to any unforesee-
able death. Id. Although felony murder is often attributed to English common law, England did not 
adopt the felony murder rule until the late nineteenth century. Id. at 417. Parliament later eliminated 
felony murder in 1957. Id. at 418. 
 63 Id. at 415. At English common law, to be charged with murder, a person need not have the 
intent to kill. Id. at 414. Instead, murder was defined as “causing death by intentionally injuring a 
person or intentionally striking a person with a weapon.” Id. at 414–15. In the nineteenth century, 
courts narrowed the definition of murder to include intentional killings and killings carried out during 
the commission of especially violent crimes. Id. at 415. For killings carried out during violent crimes, 
malice was implied by the nature of the offenses, because violent crimes tend to cause death. See id. 
(explaining that malice was implied by the showing of an “abandoned and malignant heart,” which 
was evident from unintentional killings “in the commission of an unlawful act which in its conse-
quences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a 
felonious intent” (first quoting 1817 Ga. Laws 92, 95–96; then quoting 1827 Ill. Laws 127–28)). Mal-
ice aforethought refers to the mental state that is required to be found guilty of murder at common 
law. Malice Aforethought, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12.  
 64 See Keller, supra note 12, at 304 (explaining that in addition to removing the requirement that 
the defendant must have intended to injure the victim, states also have started expanding felony mur-
der statutes to include felonies that are less heinous). 
 65 Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, supra note 60, at 409. 
 66 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 157 (“[S]ome nonintentional murderers may be among the most danger-
ous and inhumane of all—the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies, 
or the robber who shoots someone in the course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the 
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the belief that A is too morally blameworthy to be charged only with man-
slaughter or another lesser offense—A should have known that torture could 
easily result in death and A assumed the risk of killing B and C by torturing 
them in spite of this risk.67 The felony murder rule thus provides a means for 
charging A with murder.68 In addition to holding people responsible for the 
risks associated with committing dangerous felonies, the felony murder rule 
serves as a potential deterrent to criminals who are considering carrying out 
dangerous felonies.69 Those contemplating committing a felony may not do so 
if they know they will be held accountable for unintentional harms resulting 
from their actions.70 
The rationales behind the felony murder rule, however, do not legally jus-
tify the doctrine.71 Courts still must provide legal justification for felony mur-
der statutes, given that these statutes allow prosecutors to charge people, who 
had no intent to kill, with murder, which otherwise requires intent to kill.72 
Courts typically justify felony murder in one of two ways.73 Some courts rely 
on the concept of transferred intent: the intent to kill is supplied by the intent to 
commit a felony.74 Traditionally, transferred intent applies when the resulting 
                                                                                                                           
desire to rob may have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the victim’s 
property. This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the 
moral sense as an ‘intent to kill.’”). 
 67 See Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, supra note 60, at 409 (implying that certain 
killings should not be classified as genuinely unintentional or accidental just because the perpetrator’s 
objective was not murder). 
 68 See id. (explaining that lawmakers rationally support felony murder to ensure that those deserv-
ing a punishment harsher than manslaughter receive it). 
 69 See Roth & Sundby, supra note 60, at 450–51 (explaining that proponents of the felony murder 
doctrine believe that the extreme consequences of unintentional deaths during felonies will deter crim-
inals from using violence during felonies and from possibly committing the felony at all). 
 70 Id. at 450. The effect of felony murder as a deterrent is a matter of debate. Id. at 451–52. Op-
ponents of the felony murder doctrine argue that it is impossible to deter unintentional acts and that 
would-be felons likely will not know about felony murder and how it could impact them. Id. 
 71 Keller, supra note 12, at 305. 
 72 See id. (explaining the ways that courts address the inability to prove a defendant’s intent to kill 
in felony murder cases). 
 73 See id. (stating that felony murder is often justified under the principle of strict liability or 
transferred intent). 
 74 Roth & Sundby, supra note 60, at 453. Critics of felony murder view the justification of trans-
ferred intent with disdain. See id. (“Judges and commentators have criticized the transferred intent 
theory of felony murder as ‘an anachronistic remnant’ that operates ‘fictitiously’ to broaden unaccept-
ably the scope of murder.” (footnotes omitted)). Critics point out that the intent to steal is an entirely 
different intent from the malice aforethought that is required for murder. Id. at 454. In the absence of 
the felony murder rule, malice aforethought must be proven by “(1) the intent to kill, (2) the intent to 
inflict grievous bodily harm, (3) extremely reckless indifference to the value of human life . . . .” Mal-
ice Aforethought, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12. Opponents of the felony murder rule are 
even more critical of statutes that allow the intent to commit a felony to supply the intent for first-
degree murder, which typically requires the government to prove premeditation or deliberation. Roth 
& Sundby, supra note 60, at 455. In the absence of a confession, the government typically has to 
prove that a defendant took certain steps to prove the murder was premeditated. Id. As a result of the 
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harm of an individual’s actions is different from that which was anticipated, 
but equally malicious.75 For example, if A intends to shoot B but accidentally 
shoots C, A’s original malicious intent to shoot B is enough to assign A blame 
for the shooting of C.76 When applied to felony murder, transferred intent al-
lows for the malicious intent behind one action to serve as the malicious intent 
for causing an entirely different and unintended outcome.77 For example, if A 
robs B’s home and B dies from a fear-induced heart attack, A’s malicious in-
tent to the commit robbery is used to supply the intent for B’s death.78 Alterna-
tively, other courts legally justify felony murder by classifying it as a strict lia-
bility crime.79 Strict liability crimes hold defendants accountable for the con-
sequences of their illegal acts, regardless of whether the defendants intended 
those consequences.80 
Although the felony murder doctrine is most palatable when it punishes 
highly culpable individuals who should know that their actions could cause a 
death, in many states, the scope of the doctrine extends much further.81 Ryan 
Holle’s case provides an example of a broad application of felony murder—
Holle, and three men involved in the robbery who did not kill, attempt to kill, 
                                                                                                                           
felony murder doctrine, this huge burden of proof is reduced to proving the intent to commit a felony. 
Id. 
 75 Roth & Sundby, supra note 60, at 454. 
 76 See id. at 454–55 (explaining that transferred intent makes it unnecessary for the government to 
prove the mens rea for the murder because the intent to commit the felony supplies the requisite intent 
for assigning culpability for the murder). 
 77 Transferred Intent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12; see Keller, supra note 12, at 
305 (explaining that courts do not need proof that a defendant had actual malice to commit murder 
because the intent to commit the felony serves as implied malice). 
 78 See Roth & Sundby, supra note 60, at 453 (noting that transferred intent makes it unnecessary 
for the government to prove “premeditation or malice” because the intent to commit the felony sup-
plies the requisite intent for assigning culpability for the murder). 
 79 See Keller, supra note 12, at 305 (explaining that strict liability crimes are based on the idea 
that people should be held accountable for any consequences, whether intended or not, resulting from 
their bad acts). 
 80 Roth & Sundby, supra note 60, at 457. Courts justified classifying felony murder as a strict 
liability crime both for deterrent reasons and because of the idea that people who commit bad acts 
should be held accountable for the consequences of their bad acts. Id. at 457–58. Felony murder stat-
utes are broadest in states following the proximate cause theory of felony murder, which allows de-
fendants to be held responsible for any deaths, including the deaths of third parties, that occur during 
the commission of a felony. Felony Murder in Illinois, supra note 19. Eighteen states and the federal 
government follow the proximate cause theory. Id. 
 81 See Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, supra note 60, at 409–10 (pointing out that the 
felony murder rule is often applied in situations where the defendant’s highly reckless behavior is not 
the cause of the death). Guyora Binder argues that the principle of dual culpability, which requires the 
“negligent imposition of risk” and “a distinct malicious purpose,” must apply in order for a felony 
murder conviction to be valid. Id. at 409. Binder points out that in the most outrageous felony murder 
convictions—where a murder charge seems entirely disproportionate to a defendant’s culpability—
one of the two forms of culpability under the principle of dual culpability is always lacking. Id. at 410. 
Either the defendant did not negligently impose risk or the defendant did not have a specific malicious 
purpose. Id. 
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or intend to kill, faced murder charges as a result of the actions of the fourth 
man involved in the robbery, who carried out the killing alone.82 Additionally, 
prosecutors can pursue felony murder charges in situations where an accom-
plice is killed by a third party, such as a frightened homeowner during a bur-
glary.83 The surviving accomplices, even if they did not personally carry 
weapons or intend to use violence to commit the burglary, can be charged sub-
sequently with murder.84 Finally, felony murder can apply when a death is ex-
tremely unforeseeable.85 For example, non-violent burglars can face felony 
murder charges if a homeowner unexpectedly dies as a result of a home inva-
sion, such as from a fear-induced heart attack.86 
Most states and the federal government recognize the felony murder doc-
trine, and the Supreme Court has not placed significant restrictions on felony 
murder.87 It has, however, stepped in to limit the severity of the punishment for 
co-defendants convicted of felony murder who did not kill, intend to kill, or 
attempt to kill.88 In 1982, in Enmund v. Florida, the Court held that the Eighth 
                                                                                                                           
 82 Id. at 405–07, 410. Binder argues that dual culpability is not fulfilled when a defendant who 
assisted in the commission of a felony had not “shared the felonious ends.” Id. at 410. 
 83 See id.at 410 (explaining that dual culpability is not fulfilled when a third party, not an accom-
plice, commits the killing). Justin Doyle was fifteen years old when he was charged with murdering 
his friend, Travis Castle. Duaa Eldeib, Controversial Law Charges People with Murder for Death at 
Others’ Hand, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-illinois-felony-
murder-rule-juveniles-met-20160219-story.html [https://perma.cc/74YQ-29C2] [hereinafter Contro-
versial Law Charges People with Murder]. Doyle, Castle, who was fourteen, and one other minor 
broke into a home they believed was empty to steal the homeowner’s guns. Id. The boys did not know 
that the homeowner’s friend was asleep in the house. Id. When the boys opened the door to the room 
where the friend had been sleeping, he fired a shot that struck and killed Castle. Id. Doyle was charged 
with murder but pled to thirty years in prison for involuntary manslaughter and home invasion. Id. 
 84 See Controversial Law Charges People with Murder, supra note 83 (describing the case of 
Justin Doyle, who was charged with felony murder after he and a friend attempted to rob a home they 
believed to be empty, which then led to the occupant shooting and killing Doyle’s friend). 
 85 See Binder, Making the Best of Felony Murder, supra note 60, at 405–06 (citing cases where a 
defendant was charged with felony murder for striking a two-year-old who unexpectedly ran into the 
street while the defendant was driving a car he had stolen seven months prior, and another case in 
which a defendant was charged with felony murder for punching a classmate during a school yard 
fight, causing a brain hemorrhage and death). 
 86 See People v. Ingram, 492 N.E.2d 1220, 1220–21 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that a burglar who 
frightened a homeowner, causing the homeowner to suffer a heart attack and die, could be charged 
with murder). William Ingram broke into the home of Melvin Cooper after determining that Cooper 
was not home. Id. at 1220. Cooper was in fact home and woke up to the sound of a break-in. Id. When 
Ingram entered Cooper’s home through a window, Cooper stood over him with a gun and called the 
police. Id. After police arrested Ingram and left the scene, Cooper suffered a heart attack and died. Id. 
William Ingram was convicted of felony murder and burglary. Id. 
 87 See supra note 12 and accompanying text (explaining that all but eight states employ some 
form of the felony murder rule). The Supreme Court has held that the death penalty may not be im-
posed on a co-defendant if he was not involved in the killing and his involvement with the underlying 
felony was minor. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 (1982). 
 88 See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801 (holding that when a co-defendant did not kill or attempt to kill, 
he cannot be sentenced to death even if he contemplated that death might occur). 
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Amendment prevented a co-defendant in a felony murder case from being sen-
tenced to death when the co-defendant did not kill or attempt to kill.89 The de-
fendant, Earl Enmund, was the getaway driver in an armed robbery.90 When 
his co-defendants were met with resistance by the homeowners, the co-
defendants killed them.91 The Court found that there was nothing in the record 
to suggest that Enmund knew his co-defendants might kill.92 The Enmund 
Court further reasoned that Enmund’s role in the killing was too attenuated for 
the death penalty to be justified.93 
In 1987, in Tison v. Arizona, the Court limited its holding in Enmund.94 
There, the family of Gary Tison helped Tison and his cellmate, Randy 
Greenawalt, escape from an Arizona prison.95 While fleeing, the tire on the 
getaway car burst, so the group waived down a family to steal their car.96 The 
two escaped inmates proceeded to murder the family, which the rest of the Ti-
son family later claimed was completely unexpected.97 At trial, the jury found 
both of Gary Tison’s adult sons guilty of first-degree felony murder and the 
judge sentenced them to death.98 They appealed, arguing that their sentences 
were unconstitutional under Enmund.99 The Court held that when a co-
defendant plays a key role in carrying out the underlying felony and displays a 
reckless indifference to human life, Enmund does not prohibit the co-defendant 
from being sentenced to death.100 The Tison Court further emphasized the im-
                                                                                                                           
 89 Id. 
 90 See id. at 784, 788 (explaining that the record at trial only supported the inference that the de-
fendant served as the getaway driver; there was no direct evidence that confirmed the defendant as the 
getaway driver). 
 91 See id. at 784 (stating that the situation escalated when perpetrators first held the husband at 
gunpoint and he called his wife for help, who came out and shot one of the perpetrators). 
 92 See id. at 798 (noting that there was no evidence in the record to show that the defendant was 
aware of the possibility that his co-defendants would kill the homeowners if met with resistance). 
 93 See id. at 797 (reasoning that although robbery deserves a serious punishment, it is not a crime 
“so grievous an affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death” 
(footnote omitted) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 184)). After the Supreme Court reversed Enmund’s 
death sentence and remanded the case to the state court, Enmund ended up receiving two twenty-five-
year sentences to be served consecutively. State v. Enmund, 476 So. 2d 165, 168 (Fla. 1985). 
 94 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 150 (clarifying that intent as defined in Enmund was not as broad as 
some courts interpreted it to be). 
 95 Id. at 139. 
 96 Id. at 139–40. One member of the group attempted to get the attention of a passing car to stop 
while the rest of the group hid. Id. at 140. After a family pulled over, the group forced them into the 
back of their old car and drove both the old car and the victim’s car deep into the desert. Id. The in-
mates then shot into the radiator of their old car to incapacitate it. Id. According to the rest of the 
group, it was after the inmates struggled to decide what to do with the victims, which included a baby, 
that violence ensued. Id. 
 97 See id. at 141 (stating that the rest of the group reported being surprised when the two inmates 
killed the victims, but also admitted to witnessing the shootings and not aiding the victims). 
 98 Id. at 141–42. 
 99 Id. at 143; see Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. 
 100 Tison, 481 U.S. at 157–58. 
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portance of the defendants’ mental state in determining culpability.101 The 
Court held that the defendants were purposeful in orchestrating an armed pris-
on break and car robbery—two dangerous activities likely to result in vio-
lence—and, therefore, it was permissible to give them the most severe pun-
ishment possible.102 
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Juvenile Justice 
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has decided several im-
portant cases related to juvenile justice.103 In 1988, a plurality of the Court de-
cided in Thompson v. Oklahoma that juveniles younger than sixteen could not 
receive the death penalty.104 Yet, in 1989, the Court held in Stanford v. Ken-
tucky that sentencing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old defendants to death did 
not violate the Constitution.105 In 2005, in Roper v. Simmons, the Supreme 
Court held that juveniles under eighteen are not eligible for the death penal-
                                                                                                                           
 101 See id. at 158 (reasoning that the defendants each played a significant role in the crimes com-
mitted). 
 102 See id. at 156 (“Deeply ingrained in our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is 
the criminal conduct, the more serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be 
punished.”). The case was remanded to the state court and the judge sentenced the defendants to 
death. Joe Enea, Killers Escape Prison Sparking Massive Manhunt, ABC 15 ARIZ. (Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.abc15.com/news/crime/death-row-diary-two-prisoners-who-escaped-launched-largest-
manhunt-in-arizona-history (last visited Oct. 20, 2020). In 1992, the Arizona Supreme Court over-
turned the death sentences and resentenced the defendants to life in prison. Id. The defendants are still 
in prison today. Id. 
 103 See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (holding that mandatorily sentencing juveniles to life without 
parole violates the proportionality requirement of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, thereby 
violating the Eighth Amendment); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that juveniles 
not convicted of homicide may be sentenced to life only if the state allows juveniles a realistic chance 
to gain release before death); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79 (holding that juveniles under the age of 
eighteen cannot be sentenced to death).  
 104 See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988) (holding that executing a person who 
was younger than sixteen at the time of the crime violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments). 
Simmons was charged with first-degree murder, burglary, stealing, and kidnapping. Roper, 543 U.S. 
at 557. Because he was seventeen, Simmons had aged out of juvenile court in Missouri and was tried 
as an adult. Id. Simmons was found guilty of murder at trial and was sentenced to death after the jury 
recommended the death penalty during the penalty trial. Id. at 557–58. The jury reached their conclu-
sion even though they were allowed to consider age as a mitigating factor. Id. at 558. Simmons ap-
pealed his case through the Missouri courts on the grounds that his trial counsel was ineffective. Id. 
The Missouri Supreme Court denied relief. Id. at 559. Simmons then filed a petition for habeas corpus 
in federal court, which the court denied. Id. Simmons filed for relief again in state court after the U.S. 
Supreme Court held in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002), that mentally ill individuals could 
not be sentenced to death. Id. Simmons argued that the same reasoning prohibited juveniles under the 
age of eighteen from being sentenced to death. Id. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled in favor of 
Simmons and the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari. Id. at 559–60. 
 105 See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989), overruled in part by Roper, 543 U.S. at 
574 (reasoning that neither history nor modern social norms suggested that sentencing sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-old murderers to death violated the Eighth Amendment). 
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ty.106 The Court’s decision in Roper, which effectively overruled Stanford, was 
a significant milestone in juvenile justice.107 
The Court in Roper completed a two-step analysis to conclude that the 
death penalty was a disproportionate punishment for juveniles and thus violat-
ed the Eighth Amendment.108 First, the Court looked to the frequency with 
which juveniles were sentenced to death across the United States to determine 
whether the punishment was unusual.109 The Court found that twelve states had 
banned the death penalty all together, while eighteen other states had banned 
the death penalty for juveniles.110 In total, the Roper decision would impact 
only twelve states that collectively held seventy-two juveniles on death row.111 
The limited frequency with which courts imposed the death penalty on juve-
niles indicated to the Court that society assigns less culpability to juveniles 
than adults.112 
                                                                                                                           
 106 Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. The defendant in Roper, Charles Simmons, was seventeen when he 
and his friend, Charles Benjamin, brutally murdered Shirley Crook. Id. at 556. Simmons had been 
planning to murder somebody and was motivated to target Crook because the two had been in the 
same car accident. Id. Simmons and Benjamin broke into Crook’s home, tied her up, took her to the 
state park, and threw her into the Meramec River. Id. at 556–57. Crook’s body was discovered the 
next day, and Simmons had already bragged to friends about killing Crook. Id. at 557. Law enforce-
ment promptly arrested Simmons. Id. Simmons confessed to the murder and complied with law en-
forcement’s request that he demonstrate what happened at the crime scene on video. Id. 
 107 See id. at 574 (stating that Stanford no longer controlled on the issue of whether sixteen- and 
seventeen-year-olds are eligible for the death penalty); Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An 
Overview, THE SENTENCING PROJECT (Feb. 25, 2020), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/
juvenile-life-without-parole/ [https://perma.cc/FWA7-2UBV] (explaining the vast advances in juve-
nile sentencing made by the Supreme Court since Roper).  
 108 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564. 
 109 Id. The Court also noted that no other countries in the world still formally condone sentencing 
juveniles to death. Id. at 575. Although the Court acknowledged that the practices of other countries 
are not binding on U.S. law, it nevertheless examined this information for guidance on whether a 
punishment is cruel and unusual. Id. The Court was persuaded by the fact that the United States and 
Somalia were the only countries in the world that had not signed onto the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child, which bans the death penalty for youth. Id. at 576; see United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 110 Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.  
 111 Rovner, supra note 107. Of the seventy-two juveniles on death row: thirteen were in Alabama, 
four were in Arizona, three were in Florida, two were in Georgia, four were in Louisiana, five were in 
Mississippi, one was in Nevada, four were in North Carolina, two were in Pennsylvania, three were in 
South Carolina, twenty-nine were in Texas, and one was in Virginia. Case Summaries of Juvenile 
Offenders Who Were on Death Row in the United States, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, 
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/stories/case-summaries-of-juvenile-offenders-who-were-on-death-row-in-
the-united-states [https://perma.cc/FEP6-FB6C]. The last execution of a juvenile took place in Virgin-
ia in 2000. Id. 
 112 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567 (relying on the reasoning in its decision in Atkins, where the Court 
abolished the death penalty for the mentally ill, the Court determined that the scarce application of the 
death penalty to juveniles indicated that society disapproved of it, and therefore that society acknowl-
edged the diminished culpability of juveniles). 
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Second, the Court analyzed the proportionality of the punishment to de-
termine whether it was unconstitutionally cruel.113 The Roper Court held that 
the death penalty was limited to punishing the most heinous class of crimes 
and offenders, and because three important characteristics diminished juve-
niles’ culpability, juveniles could never be categorically classified among the 
most heinous offenders.114 First, juveniles tend to be less mature than adults, 
which makes any poor behavior on their part less blameworthy.115 Second, ju-
veniles are particularly vulnerable to peer pressure, partially because they have 
less control over their environments, thereby making them less culpable for 
any failure to extricate themselves from bad situations.116 Third, juveniles’ per-
sonality traits are not as established as those of adults, suggesting that it would 
be inappropriate to designate a juvenile as permanently depraved.117 
In previous cases, the Court determined that the death penalty serves two 
important social purposes: retribution and deterrence.118 In Roper, the Court 
concluded that, when applied to juveniles, the death penalty’s social goals are 
not met due to the diminished culpability of juveniles.119 The retributive goal 
of proportionality requires that the harshest possible punishment be reserved 
exclusively for the most morally culpable criminals, and juveniles will never 
be considered the most morally culpable due to their diminished capacity.120 
Additionally, the goal of deterrence is not met because less mature juveniles 
are unlikely to analyze whether the benefit of committing a crime outweighs 
the cost of possibly receiving the death penalty.121 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Id. at 564. 
 114 Id. at 569. 
 115 See id. (explaining that juveniles’ immaturity, which is evident from interactions with juve-
niles and the scientific literature, causes them to make impulsive and poorly thought through deci-
sions). Psychologist Jeffery Arnett examined juveniles’ proclivity for risk by studying common risky 
behaviors engaged in by youth, such as intercourse without protection, drunk driving, and minor crim-
inal activity. Jeffrey Arnett, Reckless Behavior in Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective, 12 
DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 339, 339 (1992). The study found that juveniles are frequently driven by 
sensation seeking and egocentrism. Id. 
 116 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569; see Arnett, supra note 115, at 354 (asserting that youth is a time of life 
when people are most influenced by others). 
 117 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 570 (stating that juveniles’ disposition and character traits are still in 
flux and capable of change). 
 118 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319; Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183. 
 119 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (explaining that these justifications are applicable to adults, but 
less so to juveniles because of their unique characteristics). 
 120 See id. (“Retribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is imposed on one 
whose culpability or blameworthiness is diminished, to a substantial degree, by reason of youth and 
immaturity.”). 
 121 See id. (reasoning that the same characteristics that make juveniles less culpable, like immatu-
rity and susceptibility to peer pressure, also make it unlikely that juveniles would be deterred from 
committing a crime because of the possible consequences); Keller, supra note 12, at 317 (noting that 
the Court in Enmund was skeptical of the effect of deterrence on adults, suggesting that the Court 
should be even more skeptical of its effect on youths). 
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Five years later, applying the same two-step analysis utilized in Roper, 
the Supreme Court concluded in Graham v. Florida that juveniles who had not 
been convicted of homicide were prohibited from being sentenced to life with-
out parole.122 First, the Court relied upon the infrequency with which juveniles 
who had not killed were being sentenced to die in prison to conclude that such 
a sentence was unusual.123 At the time of the ruling in Graham, only eleven 
states had juveniles serving life without parole for non-homicide offenses and, 
among these states, Florida was responsible for imposing the vast majority of 
those sentences.124 Next, the Graham Court used its precedent and the Eighth 
Amendment’s history to assess whether the punishment was cruel.125 After 
Roper, life without parole had become the harshest possible punishment for 
juveniles under the age of eighteen.126 In Graham, the Court reasoned that a 
non-homicide crime did not warrant the harshest possible punishment of death 
and, therefore, juveniles who committed non-homicide offenses could not be 
sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, as this essentially amounted 
to a death sentence.127 Additionally, the Graham Court noted that life sentences 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding that juveniles not convicted of homicide may be sen-
tenced to life only if the state allows juveniles a realistic chance to gain release before death). The 
defendant, Terrance Jamar Graham, was sixteen years old in 2003 when he was arrested for a robbery 
attempt. Id. at 53. Under Florida law, it was permissible for the prosecutor to treat Graham as an adult, 
so Graham was charged with armed burglary with assault or battery and attempted armed robbery. Id. 
If found guilty, Graham faced a maximum sentence of life in prison without parole for the first charge 
and a maximum sentence of fifteen years for the second charge. Id. at 53–54. Instead of going to trial, 
Graham pleaded guilty to the charges and received three years of probation. Id. at 54. Graham ex-
pressed extreme remorse to the court and promised to get his life on track. Id. About a year after enter-
ing the plea, Graham was again arrested after fleeing from police for his suspected participation in 
multiple robberies, which constituted a violation of his probation. Id. at 55. Two hearings were held 
regarding Graham’s probation violations and Graham, despite being advised that a violation of proba-
tion could expose him to the maximum sentences for his 2003 crimes, admitted that he violated his 
probation when he fled arrest. Id. The court found Graham to be in violation of his probation. Id. At 
his sentencing hearing, the judge ignored the sentencing recommendations put forth by both Graham’s 
defense, the Department of Corrections, and the prosecution, and sentenced Graham to the maximum 
possible sentence for his probation violation: life in prison without parole for the armed burglary and 
an additional fifteen years for the attempted armed robbery. Id. at 56–57. 
 123 Id. at 62. 
 124 See Rovner, supra note 107 (pointing out that of the 123 prisoners serving life in prison for 
non-homicide offenses, seventy-seven were in Florida and the rest were dispersed across ten other 
states). After Graham, in 2012, the Court decided in Miller v. Alabama that mandatory life in prison 
without parole was an impermissible sentence for juveniles. Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. Later, in Mont-
gomery v. Louisiana, in 2016, the Court held that Miller applied retroactively. 136 S. Ct. 718, 736–37 
(2016). As a result, all individuals serving a sentence of mandatory life without parole for crimes they 
committed as juveniles were entitled to parole hearings. Rovner, supra note 107. 
 125 Graham, 560 U.S. at 61. 
 126 See Rovner, supra note 107 (explaining that because Roper banned the death penalty for juve-
niles under eighteen, the worst punishment a juvenile can receive is life in prison without parole). 
 127 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (reasoning that the worst possible punishment for juveniles 
should be reserved for those who commit the worst possible crimes, such as homicide). 
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for defendants convicted as juveniles are staggeringly long compared to the 
life sentences of those convicted as middle-aged adults.128 
In 2012, the Court extended the holding of Graham even further in Miller 
v. Alabama.129 In Miller, the Court made it unconstitutional for juveniles con-
victed of homicide to receive mandatory life without parole.130 Juveniles could 
still be sentenced to life without parole, but only at the discretion of a judge 
and not because a statute mandated the sentence.131 To reach its decision, the 
Miller Court combined its lines of precedent on proportionality and individual-
ized sentencing requirements for the death penalty.132 The Court determined 
that because juveniles are less mature, more susceptible to peer pressure, and 
more amenable to reform than adults, judges must assess the individual cir-
cumstances of each crime and perpetrator in order to determine a fair sen-
tence.133 Although, after Miller, judges can still make the determination based 
                                                                                                                           
 128 See id. at 70 (reasoning that a juvenile sentenced to life without parole will serve more years 
than an adult and will be detained for a larger percentage of his life). 
 129 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (holding that mandatorily sentencing juveniles to life without 
parole violates the proportionality requirement of the Eighth Amendment, thereby violating the Cruel 
and Unusual Punishments Clause). In Miller, the Court considered the appeals of two petitioners, 
Kuntrell Jackson and Evan Miller, both of whom had been mandatorily sentenced to life without pa-
role for crimes they committed at age fourteen. Id. at 465. Kuntrell Jackson was fourteen years old in 
1999 when he was involved in an attempted robbery. Id. He made plans to rob a video store with two 
other boys. Id. On the way, he found out that one of the boys had a gun. Id. Jackson decided not to go 
into the store with the other two boys and instead waited outside. Id. Jackson eventually entered the 
store and saw one of the boys pointing the gun at the store clerk and demanding money. Id. The boy, 
Derrick Shields, shot and killed the store clerk when she threatened to call the police. Id. at 466. Jack-
son was charged and found guilty of capital felony murder and aggravated robbery. Id. The judge was 
statutorily required to sentence Jackson to life without parole. Id.; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-104(b) 
(2019) (requiring those convicted of capital murder to be sentenced to life in prison without parole or 
death); Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838 (holding that juveniles under the age of sixteen at the time of the 
offense may not be sentenced to death). Evan Miller was fourteen years old in 2003 when he attempt-
ed a robbery and ended up in an altercation with the victim. Miller, 567 U.S. at 468. Miller’s accom-
plice and friend stepped in and hit the victim with a baseball bat. Id. Miller then took the bat and hit 
the victim several times himself. Id. The boys left the victim and then returned later to hide the evi-
dence of the crime by setting fire to the victim’s trailer. Id. The victim ended up dying from smoke 
inhalation and the blows from the baseball bat. Id. Miller was charged with and found guilty of “mur-
der in the course of arson,” which statutorily requires a sentence of life in prison without parole. Id. at 
469; see ALA. CODE §§ 13A-5-40(a)(9); 13A-6-2(c) (2019). 
 130 Miller, 567 U.S. at 489. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See id. at 470 (explaining that one line of cases focuses on the fact that certain sentences will 
be inappropriate for special groups of offenders, while the other line of cases focuses on the need to 
account for the individual circumstances of certain individuals during the sentencing phase). 
 133 See id. at 477 (relying on the differences between juveniles and adults first articulated by the 
Court in Roper). The Miller ruling requires judges to consider the following factors, known as the 
“Miller factors,” when sentencing juveniles: age, circumstances of upbringing, degree of participation 
in the offense, youth incompetency, and capacity for rehabilitation. Id. at 477–78. 
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on the circumstances that a juvenile deserves life without parole, states can no 
longer statutorily require judges to sentence juveniles to life without parole.134 
In his concurrence, Justice Stephen Breyer argued that the Miller Court 
also should have eliminated discretionary life without parole for juveniles who 
did not kill or intend to kill.135 According to Justice Breyer, such a conclusion 
was required given the Court’s reasoning in Graham, in which the Court stated 
that a juvenile offender’s already diminished culpability is “twice diminished,” 
compared to that of an adult murderer, when the juvenile did not kill or intend 
to kill.136 Justice Breyer’s argument, moreover, logically follows the Court’s 
prior holdings in Enmund, Tison, and Roper.137 Enmund and Tison established 
that the culpability of those who do not kill or show reckless indifference to 
human life is once diminished from the culpability of those who actually 
kill.138 Furthermore, Roper established that the culpability of juveniles, merely 
by the nature of their immaturity, is once diminished from that of adults.139 
Therefore, by consolidating the decisions in those three cases, the culpability 
                                                                                                                           
 134 See id. at 479–80 (noting that judges may still make the decision to sentence juveniles con-
victed of homicide offenses to life in prison, but that they must consider juveniles’ diminished culpa-
bility). After the Miller decision, there was disagreement among states over whether the Court’s hold-
ing applied retroactively. See Rovner, supra note 107 (noting that of the twenty-eight states with stat-
utes impacted by the Miller decision, seven states found that Miller was not retroactive and fourteen 
states found that it was). In 2016, the Supreme Court held in Montgomery that Miller applied retroac-
tively, meaning that individuals serving mandatory life in prison without parole were entitled to parole 
hearings. 136 S. Ct. at 736–37; Rovner, supra note 107. 
 135 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 491 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reasoning that the transferred intent used 
to justify the felony murder rule is insufficient to serve as intent under the Eighth Amendment because 
in Enmund the Court ruled that transferred intent cannot be relied upon to decide whether the death 
penalty is permissible for an adult). 
 136 See id. at 490–91 (“Quite simply, if the juvenile either kills or intends to kill the victim, he 
lacks ‘twice diminished’ responsibility. But where the juvenile neither kills nor intends to kill, both 
features emphasized in Graham as extenuating apply.”). 
 137 See id. (reasoning that Roper established that juveniles are inherently less culpable than adults, 
while Enmund and Tison held that accomplices charged with felony murder who did not kill, attempt 
to kill, or intend to kill may not have the requisite culpability to receive the harshest sentence); Roper, 
543 U.S. at 578–79 (holding that juveniles, because they possess characteristics that make them less 
culpable for criminal behavior than adults, can never be sentenced to death); Tison, 481 U.S. at 158 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment does not prevent individuals convicted of felony murder who did 
not kill from being sentenced to death if the record supports that the individual displayed a reckless 
indifference to human life); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801 (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits 
individuals convicted of felony murder who did not kill from being sentenced to death if the individu-
al did not intend to kill). 
 138 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 158 (holding that prosecutors do not violate the Eighth Amendment 
when they charge accomplices with felony murder who (1) play a key role in carrying out the underly-
ing felony and (2) display a reckless indifference to human life); Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801 (holding 
that when a defendant has not killed or attempted to kill, a judge cannot sentence the individual to 
death even if he or she contemplated that death might occur). 
 139 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 572–73 (holding that juveniles under the age of eighteen cannot be 
sentenced to death). 
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of juveniles who did not kill or intend to kill is “twice diminished” compared 
to adults who intentionally killed.140 
Outside of its juvenile sentencing jurisprudence, in 2011, the Court held 
in J.D.B. v. North Carolina that a child’s age is a relevant factor in a Miranda 
v. Arizona custody analysis.141 In Miranda, the Court held that when criminal 
defendants undergo custodial interrogation, they must be informed of their 
constitutional right against self-incrimination in order for their statements to be 
admissible in court.142 After Miranda, confusion among lower courts over the 
definition of “custodial interrogation” prompted the Supreme Court to outline 
a custody analysis in 1995 in Thompson v. Keohane.143 Determining whether a 
suspect is “in custody” involves evaluating the factors surrounding the interro-
gation and assessing whether a reasonable person in those circumstances 
would have felt free to end the interrogation.144 The analysis is intended to be 
objective—enabling a police officer, in real-time, to assess whether a reasona-
ble person in the circumstances of the defendant would feel free to leave the 
interrogation.145 In J.D.B., the Court held that a child’s age is a relevant factor 
that officers must consider when determining whether a reasonable person in 
the defendant’s position would feel free to terminate police questioning.146 
Through its holding, the J.D.B. Court formally recognized that juveniles, be-
cause of their unique characteristics, require special treatment; they cannot be 
held to the reasonable person standard that applies to all adults.147 
                                                                                                                           
 140 Miller, 567 U.S. at 490 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 141 See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011) (holding that considering a child’s age 
during a Miranda custody inquiry comports with the test’s objectivity requirement). In Miranda v. 
Arizona, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination renders any 
statement made in the course of interrogation in a police-dominated setting inadmissible if the defend-
ant was not informed of his or her constitutional rights. 384 U.S. 436, 498–99 (1966). 
 142 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 498–99. In addition, Miranda established that defendants must be made 
aware of their right to have an attorney present during law enforcement questioning. Id. at 471. 
 143 See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 107, 112 (1995) (addressing a conflict over whether 
the defendant was “in custody” at time of his confession). 
 144 Id. at 112. The Court in Thompson v. Keohane explained that two analyses must be done to 
determine whether an individual is in custody. Id. First, the court must consider the setting and nature 
of the interrogation Id. Second, the court must consider whether a reasonable individual would have 
understood that he or she was free to end the conversation. Id. After the scenario is reconstructed, the 
court makes an objective determination on whether the individual’s freedom was restrained such that 
he or she was under formal arrest. Id. 
 145 See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 271 (explaining that the objective analysis to determine whether a 
suspect is in custody is intended to ensure that police still will be able to make real-time decisions on 
whether they should give Miranda warnings). The custody analysis does not ask officers to consider 
specific factors. Id. Instead, it requires officers to make a holistic judgement, taking into consideration 
all the circumstances surrounding an interrogation, to determine if a reasonable person would feel free 
to leave. Id. 
 146 See id. at 271–72 (reasoning that a child’s age informs common sense deductions about the 
child’s behavior that should be evident to anyone who used to be a kid). 
 147 Id. at 281. Interestingly, civil law has long recognized that the reasonable person standard does 
not apply well to children. Marsha L. Levick & Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, The United States Supreme 
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II. THREE APPROACHES TO CHALLENGING THE APPLICATION  
OF FELONY MURDER TO JUVENILES 
Reconciling the Supreme Court’s juvenile justice jurisprudence with its 
Eighth Amendment and felony murder precedent is difficult because the culpa-
bility requirements of the Eighth Amendment and the felony murder doctrine 
contradict the Court’s concession that juveniles’ recklessness, immaturity, and 
impulsivity make them less capable of assessing the consequences of their ac-
tions.148 Although the Court’s Eighth Amendment, felony murder, and juvenile 
justice precedent seemingly cannot be squared, crafting a legally sound argu-
ment that establishes that such contradiction is unconstitutional remains diffi-
cult.149 Still, there are several ways to challenge the practice of charging juve-
niles with felony murder.150 Section A of this Part explains how charging juve-
niles with felony murder can be challenged through the constitutionality of the 
sentence that accompanies felony murder convictions.151 Section B outlines 
how juvenile felony murder can be attacked on the basis of the policy behind 
felony murder.152 Section C describes how charging juveniles with felony 
murder can be opposed using constitutional requirements surrounding culpa-
bility.153 
A. The Eighth Amendment Bans Sentencing Juveniles to  
Die in Prison for Felony Murder 
One way to challenge felony murder for juveniles indirectly is by chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the harsh sentences that are inflicted upon ju-
veniles convicted of felony murder.154 Discretionary life without parole is cur-
                                                                                                                           
Court Adopts a Reasonable Juvenile Standard in J.D.B v. North Carolina for Purposes of the Miranda 
Custody Analysis: Can a More Reasoned Justice System for Juveniles Be Far Behind?, 47 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 501, 502 (2012). In every U.S. jurisdiction, if it is necessary to assess whether a 
child behaved negligently, the child is held to the standard of a “reasonable person of like age, intelli-
gence, and experience under like circumstances.” Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 283A (AM. LAW INST. 1965)). Until the Court’s decision in J.D.B., juveniles’ developmental differ-
ences were not typically accounted for in criminal law. Id. at 503.  
 148 See Amended Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al., in Support of Appellants, 
Blake Layman and Levi Sparks at 8, Layman v. State, 17 N.E.3d 957 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (No. 20-A-
04-1310-CR-518), 2014 WL 4168700 (noting that “Roper, Graham, J.D.B., and Miller all preclude 
ascribing the same level of anticipation or foreseeability to a juvenile who takes part in a felony as the 
law ascribes to an adult”). 
 149 See id. (providing an example of an argument made against charging juveniles with felony 
murder that did not succeed in court). 
 150 See infra notes 154–233 and accompanying text. 
 151 See infra notes 154–194 and accompanying text. 
 152 See infra notes 195–210 and accompanying text. 
 153 See infra notes 211–233 and accompanying text. 
 154 See Michael T. Moore, Jr., Felony Murder, Juveniles, and Culpability: Why the Eighth 
Amendment’s Ban on Cruel and Unusual Punishment Should Preclude Sentencing Juveniles Who Do 
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rently the harshest sentence available for juveniles convicted of felony mur-
der.155 Challenging the constitutionality of that sentence would indirectly con-
test the application of felony murder to juveniles because it would make life 
with parole the harshest possible sentence that juveniles could receive.156 As a 
result, juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill could receive 
sentences more proportionate to the underlying felony that they committed.157 
Although this argument would not end the practice of charging juveniles with 
felony murder, it could significantly improve outcomes for juveniles convicted 
of felony murder.158 Much of the existing scholarship surrounding the constitu-
tionality of felony murder as applied to juveniles focuses on sentencing be-
cause it offers a more realistic avenue for reform based upon the Supreme 
Court’s recent favorable juvenile sentencing decisions.159 Although this type of 
challenge would arguably result in the least satisfying outcome for advocates 
seeking to end the application of felony murder to juveniles, it is worth consid-
ering given its reasonable chance of success.160 
Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama present log-
ical inroads to challenging felony murder for juveniles because of the powerful 
                                                                                                                           
Not Kill, Intend to Kill, or Attempt to Kill to Die in Prison, 16 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 99, 126 (2014) 
(arguing that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or 
intend to kill to life without the possibility of parole); Mariko K. Shitama, Note, Bringing Our Chil-
dren Back from the Land of the Nod: Why the Eighth Amendment Forbids Condemning Juveniles to 
Die in Prison for Accessorial Felony Murder, 65 FLA. L. REV. 813, 820 (2012) (arguing that Graham 
v. Florida bans sentencing juveniles who did not kill or intend to kill to die in prison and that courts 
should retroactively apply Miller v. Alabama by reconsidering the sentences of those who did not kill 
or intend to kill). 
 155 See Moore, supra note 154, at 101 (explaining that discretionary life without parole is current-
ly the harshest sentence available for juveniles convicted of felony murder). Of the forty-five jurisdic-
tions in the United States that currently recognize the felony murder doctrine, twenty-four allow de-
fendants convicted of felony murder to be sentenced to death. Jason Tashea, California Considering 
End to Felony Murder Rule, ABA J. (July 5, 2018), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
california_considering_end_to_felony_murder_rule [https://perma.cc/7K7J-FENQ]. Because juveniles 
are not eligible for the death penalty or life without parole, discretionary life without parole is the 
harshest available sentence for juveniles convicted of felony murder. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 
460, 489 (2012) (holding that mandatorily sentencing juveniles to life without parole violates the 
proportionality requirement of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, thereby violating the 
Eighth Amendment).  
 156 See Shitama, supra note 154, at 819 (explaining that Miller did not ban life without parole 
entirely). 
 157 Moore, supra note 154, at 101–02. 
 158 Id. 
 159 See, e.g., Miller, 567 U.S. at 489; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010) (holding that 
juveniles not convicted of homicide may be sentenced to life only if the state affords juveniles a real-
istic chance to gain release before death); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005) (holding 
that juveniles under the age of eighteen cannot be sentenced to death). 
 160 See infra notes 237–245 and accompanying text (explaining the strengths and weaknesses of 
challenging felony murder for juveniles on sentencing grounds). 
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language in these opinions regarding juvenile brain development.161 Roper 
eliminated the death penalty for juveniles, Graham eliminated life without pa-
role for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses, and Miller eliminated 
mandatory life without parole for juveniles convicted of any crime, even hom-
icide.162 The next logical step would be to eliminate the harshest sentence 
available for juveniles following Miller: discretionary life without parole.163 
Assessing the constitutionality of life without parole for juveniles requires 
the same analysis the Court used in Roper and Graham, both of which categor-
ically eliminated a form of punishment for a specific group of individuals.164 
The Court must first determine if there is a national consensus on whether dis-
cretionary life without parole is an appropriate sentence for juveniles, and then 
it must consider whether the sentence is constitutional based on the Court’s 
precedent and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.165 Following this ap-
proach, it is very possible that the Court could conclude that discretionary life 
without parole is an unconstitutional sentence for juveniles.166 First, data 
shows that as of 2018, many states have moved away from sentencing juve-
niles to life without parole.167 In twenty-six states and the District of Colum-
bia, no incarcerated individuals were serving life without parole for crimes 
                                                                                                                           
 161 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (reiterating that the special characteristics of adolescents make 
harsh sentences less suitable even for juveniles that commit the worst crimes); Graham, 560 U.S. at 
68 (explaining that advances in brain science and psychology support the conclusion that juveniles’ 
minds are fundamentally different from those of adults); Roper, 543 U.S. at 579 (concluding that 
juveniles can never be classified among the most heinous criminals because of the status of their brain 
development). Kuntrell Jackson, one of the defendants in Miller, was charged with felony murder 
even though he did not kill or intend to kill the victim. Miller, 567 U.S. at 465–66; see also Jackson v. 
Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Ark. 2011) (Danielson, J., dissenting) (stating that there was scant evi-
dence of the defendant’s intent to kill as he did not have a gun, did not shoot the victim, and his in-
volvement with the underlying felony was minor), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Miller, 567 U.S. 
460.  
 162 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 489 (holding that mandatorily sentencing juveniles to life without 
parole violates the proportionality requirement of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, thereby 
violating the Eighth Amendment); Graham, 560 U.S. at 82 (holding that juveniles not convicted of 
homicide may be sentenced to life only if the state affords juveniles a realistic chance to gain release 
before death); Roper, 543 U.S. at 578–79 (holding that juveniles under the age of eighteen cannot be 
sentenced to death). 
 163 See Moore, supra note 154, at 126 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing 
juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill to discretionary life without the possibility 
of parole). 
 164 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 483 (likening the categorical ban on mandatory life without parole for 
non-homicide offenses in Graham to the complete ban on the death penalty in Roper); Graham, 560 
U.S. at 61–62 (explaining that when a sentence as applied to a specific class of criminals is chal-
lenged, the Court first conducts an objective analysis of whether there is agreement across states on 
the appropriateness of the sentence). 
 165 Graham, 560 U.S. at 61. 
 166 See id. at 62 (explaining that in order to determine whether there is national consensus, the 
Court will look to the states’ laws as well as its sentencing statistics in practice). 
 167 See Rovner, supra note 107 (explaining that twenty-three jurisdictions have stopped sentenc-
ing juveniles to life without parole). 
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they committed as juveniles.168 Some of those states explicitly prohibited the 
sentence and others evidently chose not impose it, as no prisoners were serving 
life without parole for crimes they committed as juveniles.169 Twenty-eight 
states still permitted sentencing juveniles to life without parole.170 Yet, only 
three states—Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Michigan—imposed the vast ma-
jority of life without parole sentences for juveniles.171 In Graham, although 
thirty-seven states allowed juveniles who committed non-homicide offenses to 
be sentenced to life without parole, the Court nonetheless held that the sen-
tence was unconstitutional.172 In the case of discretionary life without parole, 
only twenty-nine states allow the sentence for juveniles, and only three of 
those states are responsible for imposing the bulk of those sentences.173 The 
Court in Graham also relied upon the fact that the United States was the only 
country in the world to sentence juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses 
to life without parole.174 Today, the United States is the only country in the 
world that carries out sentences of life without parole against juveniles.175 Alt-
hough the Court may conclude that there is consensus against imposing life 
without parole on juveniles, that alone does not make the practice unconstitu-
tional.176 
In addition to assessing whether there is a national consensus, the Court 
must examine the constitutionality of the punishment based on its precedent 
and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment—namely, the Court must contem-
plate whether the severity of the punishment is proportionate to the defendant’s 
culpability.177 Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Miller, as discussed in Part I, 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See id. (noting that these twenty-seven jurisdictions either banned the sentence or have nobody 
serving it). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. 
 171 See id. (stating that Louisiana, Pennsylvania, and Michigan account for two-thirds of the juve-
nile life without parole sentences in the United States). 
 172 Graham, 560 U.S. at 62–63, 82; Roper, 543 U.S. at 578; Rovner, supra note 107. 
 173 See supra note 168 and accompanying text (stating that twenty-seven jurisdictions have elimi-
nated life with parole for juveniles). 
 174 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 80 (citing research finding that only eleven countries technically 
permit life without parole for juveniles and, of those countries, just the United States and Israel seem 
to inflict the sentence). 
 175 See Rovner, supra note 107 (asserting that as of February 25, 2020, no other country sentenced 
juveniles to life in prison without parole). Two thousand one hundred juveniles in the United States were 
serving life in prison without parole as of 2018. Adam Janos, The Offenders Behind 3 Court Cases That 
Changed Lifetime Imprisonment Laws for Juveniles, A&E (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.aetv.com/real-
crime/terrance-graham-florida-evan-miller-alabama-henry-montgomery-louisiana-cases-life [https://
perma.cc/6767-NGNX]. 
 176 Graham, 560 U.S. at 67. 
 177 See id. (stating that the Court is ultimately responsible for determining the constitutionality of 
the practice in question based on the Court’s precedent and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment). 
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makes a strong argument that sentencing juveniles to life without parole is un-
constitutional based upon the Court’s precedent.178 
The penological justifications of a punishment are also relevant to the 
Court’s judgment on whether the punishment is constitutional.179 The felony 
murder doctrine is primarily justified based on the deterrent effect it supposed-
ly has on would-be felons.180 The underlying logic is that if individuals consid-
ering committing a felony know they will face substantial punishment should 
something go awry, then they will be deterred from committing the felony al-
together.181 Whether the threat of a harsh sentence effectively deters adult 
crime is a matter of debate, but in Roper and Graham the Court concluded that 
harsh sentences were unlikely to deter juvenile crime.182 In both of these deci-
sions, the Court explained that the same qualities that make juveniles less cul-
pable than adults—immaturity, susceptibility to peer pressure, and capacity for 
reform—make the threat of harsh punishments less effective.183 Juveniles are 
simply less likely to engage in the cost-benefit analysis that the deterrence 
model assumes.184 The Court’s reasoning in Roper and Graham can similarly 
be used to reject the deterrent value of sentencing juveniles convicted of felony 
murder to life without parole.185 
Although felony murder is most often justified by deterrence, discretion-
ary life without parole sentences also do not serve retributive ends.186 Retribu-
tion relies on the principle of proportionality—the idea that the punishment for 
a crime should be proportionate to the defendant’s moral culpability.187 The 
Roper Court determined that retribution is less persuasive when applied to ju-
veniles because their diminished culpability causes punishments of the harsh-
                                                                                                                           
 178 See supra notes 135–140 and accompanying text (outlining Justice Breyer’s argument that the 
Constitution forbids sentencing juveniles who did not kill or intend to kill to the harshest possible 
sentence—discretionary life without parole). 
 179 Graham, 560 U.S. at 71. 
 180 See Moore, supra note 154, at 105 (explaining that deterrence is often relied upon as a justifi-
cation for the felony murder rule). 
 181 See Roth & Sundby, supra note 60, at 451 (noting that proponents of the felony murder rule 
believe that the possibility of being charged with murder will deter criminals from committing felo-
nies). 
 182 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 72 (explaining that juveniles’ unique characteristics make it unlikely 
that they will engage in a cost-benefit analysis during their decision-making process); Roper, 543 U.S. 
at 578–79 (noting that juveniles’ personality traits make it unlikely that deterrence will impact their 
decision making). 
 183 Graham, 560 U.S. at 72. 
 184 Id. 
 185 See id. (determining that juveniles’ underdeveloped brains make them unlikely to contemplate 
the possibility of harsh punishment before deciding to commit a crime). 
 186 See id. at 71 (reasoning that retributivism is based on the idea that a person’s punishment 
should be equal to his or her culpability, which is not possible when the defendant is a juvenile ac-
cused of felony murder). 
 187 See Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987) (“The heart of the retribution rationale is that 
a criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.”). 
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est possible degree to be disproportionate.188 These arguments also apply to 
discretionary life without parole.189 Finally, incapacitation does not provide 
adequate justification for life without parole because such a sentence requires 
determining that a juvenile will always pose a threat to society.190 The Court in 
Graham noted that making such a decision should be infrequent because juve-
niles by their very nature are constantly changing, evolving, and reforming.191 
Finally, in Miller, the Court relied heavily upon the idea that the worst 
possible sentence should be reserved for the worst offenders.192 After Miller, 
the worst possible sentence available for juveniles is currently discretionary 
life without parole.193 Court precedent further suggests that the harshest possi-
ble punishment is not suitable for juveniles charged with felony murder who 
did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill.194 
B. The Reasonable Juvenile Standard Articulated in J.D.B. v. North 
Carolina Is at Odds with the Principle of Transferred  
Intent, Central to the Felony Murder Doctrine 
Charging juveniles with felony murder can also be challenged on the 
grounds that felony murder statutes do not require the government to prove 
any form of intent.195 Without a statutory requirement of proving criminal in-
tent, there is no opportunity for juries or judges to consider juveniles’ dimin-
                                                                                                                           
 188 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 571 (stating that retribution can be explained as a means for the com-
munity to alert the defendant to its disapproval, or as a method for remedying the harm inflicted on the 
victim by the defendant). The retributive goal of proportionality is not met when the culpability of a 
defendant is diminished by immaturity. Id. 
 189 See id. (holding that the principle of proportionality is violated when courts impose the harsh-
est penalty upon someone with diminished culpability, such as a juvenile). Sentencing juveniles who 
did not kill or intend to kill to life in prison violates the proportionality requirement because doing so 
thwarts the intention that the harshest possible sentence be exclusively reserved for the most culpable 
offenders. Id. 
 190 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 72–73 (noting that although incapacitation is important, given the 
high possibility that a criminal will reoffend, the case for incapacitation is weaker with respect to 
youths because they have a higher capacity for reform and it is impossible to distinguish between 
youthful immaturity and permanent corruption). 
 191 Id. 
 192 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 479 (holding that sentencing juveniles to the most severe possible 
punishment creates the opportunity for disproportionality). 
 193 See id. at 489 (holding that mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth 
Amendment, leaving discretionary life without parole as the harshest possible sentence for juveniles). 
 194 See Moore, supra note 154, at 126 (arguing that life without parole is not a suitable punish-
ment unless the most severe possible crime is involved). 
 195 See Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 524–25 (“Felony murder statutes generally do not 
incorporate the concept of reasonableness on their face—the statutes arise from legislatures’ determi-
nations that an individual electing to participate in the commission of a felony thereby subjects herself 
to strict liability for the results of her actions and those of her accomplices, regardless of whether she 
had specific intent for a death to result or subjectively foresaw the risk of death.”). 
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ished culpability when determining their guilt or innocence.196 Using the hold-
ing of J.D.B. v. North Carolina, Marsha Levick, the Chief Legal Officer of the 
Juvenile Law Center, and Elizabeth-Ann Tierney, a former legal fellow at the 
Juvenile Law Center, proposed a theory in 2012 that charging juveniles with 
felony murder is unconstitutional because felony murder statutes do not ac-
count for juveniles’ diminished capacity.197 In J.D.B., the Court held that the 
custodial analysis from Miranda v. Arizona required law enforcement officers 
to consider whether a reasonable juvenile would feel free to end an interroga-
tion when determining if Miranda warnings should be issued.198 
Although the J.D.B. decision appears narrow, the fact that the Court 
acknowledged the age of a juvenile as an objective factor to be considered dur-
ing Miranda’s custodial analysis is significant.199 Prior to the Court’s decision 
in J.D.B., juveniles’ developmental differences were not typically recognized 
in criminal law, despite having long been acknowledged in civil law.200 The 
J.D.B. ruling also had implications for charging juveniles with felony murder, 
as felony murder is often justified by the idea that some felonies are so dan-
gerous that it should be reasonably foreseeable to perpetrators that death may 
occur.201 Although foreseeability is used to justify punishing people for crimes 
                                                                                                                           
 196 Id. at 525. 
 197 J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011); see Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 
503 (explaining that J.D.B. required that in Miranda v. Arizona’s custody analysis, the reasonable 
person standard, which has long been considered ill-suited for juveniles in tort law, account for a 
person’s age). 
 198 See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 277 (reasoning that a juvenile undergoing interrogation could perceive 
a greater pressure to respond to questions than an adult under the same circumstances); Levick & 
Tierney, supra note 147, at 503 (explaining that the Court considered whether a reasonable juvenile 
standard was necessary under the facts of J.D.B., which involved “a thirteen-year-old middle-school 
student who was removed from class and interrogated about burglaries in his neighborhood by four 
adults, including a police investigator and a uniformed school resource officer, in a closed-door con-
ference room”); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 498–99 (1966) (holding that suspects 
must be appraised of their constitutional rights during police questioning in order for their statements 
to be admissible in court).  
 199 See Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 506 (noting that the Court was very concerned with 
making it clear that applying a reasonable juvenile standard did not interfere with the objective nature 
of the test). Despite J.D.B. representing a significant milestone for juvenile justice, some scholars 
argue that more substantial protections are necessary to prevent wrongful convictions of juveniles. See 
Maxwell J. Fabiszewski, Note, Major Reforms for Minors’ Confessions: Rethinking Self-Incrim-
ination Protections for Juveniles, 61 B.C. L. REV. 2643, 2688 (2020), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.
edu/bclr/vol61/iss7/8 [https://perma.cc/SW69-WB89] (“[M]ost juveniles, especially those below the 
age of fifteen, cannot understand either their rights or the consequences of waiving them and giving 
statements to law enforcement.”). Because of their diminished capacity, confessions given by juve-
niles, even under the best of circumstances, pose a large risk of being invalid or involuntary. Id. at 
2689. 
 200 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (explaining the tradition of recognizing juveniles’ 
diminished capacity in civil courts throughout the United States). 
 201 See Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 524–25 (stating that the mens rea in felony murder 
cases is supplied using transferred intent, which is justified by the reasoning that a reasonable person 
would understand that death could occur as a result of committing a dangerous felony). 
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they did not necessarily intend to commit, most felony murder statutes do not 
require the government to prove that the death was reasonably foreseeable.202 
To convict an offender, the jury must find only that: (1) the defendant intended 
to carry out the underlying felony, and (2) a death occurred in the commission 
of that felony.203 The entirely objective nature of the test removes the oppor-
tunity for a jury to consider the diminished culpability of juveniles charged 
with felony murder.204 Levick and Tierney argue that the Court should, as it did 
in J.D.B., recognize that a different standard must be used for juveniles 
charged with felony murder.205 Such a standard would account for the fact that 
juveniles are less capable of foreseeing the possible consequences of their ac-
tions and would acknowledge that it is contradictory to charge juveniles who 
did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill with felony murder.206 After all, if a 
juvenile’s age must be considered in determining whether a reasonable person 
in that juvenile’s position would know they were free to leave a police interro-
gation, then it follows that a juvenile’s age must also be considered in deter-
mining whether a juvenile could reasonably foresee that death could occur as a 
result of an inherently dangerous felony.207 
                                                                                                                           
 202 See id. (noting that felony murder is considered a strict liability crime, meaning that if a person 
participates in a felony and death occurs, he or she may be found guilty of felony murder regardless of 
whether there was any intent to kill). For example, the federal felony murder statute provides in rele-
vant part: “Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder 
perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premedi-
tated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, 
kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, bur-
glary, or robbery . . . is murder in the first degree.” 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a) (2018). 
 203 See Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 525 (explaining that felony murder statutes, which 
are strict liability offenses, provide no opportunity for jurors to account for juveniles’ diminished 
culpability). For a defendant to be found guilty of felony murder in federal court, “[i]t is sufficient if 
the government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knowingly and willfully commit-
ted or attempted to commit the crime as charged in the indictment, and that the killing of the victim 
occurred during, and as a consequence of, the defendant’s commission of or attempt to commit that 
crime.” CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION COMM. OF THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
TENTH CIRCUIT, CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 2.52.1 (2018), https://www.ca10.
uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/clerk/Jury%20Instructions%20Update%202018.pdf [https://perma.
cc/X435-ZWG6]. 
 204 See Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 526 (“Because of this flaw in the construction of the 
felony murder statutes, the solution to this problem is not as simple as requiring fact-finders to incor-
porate age into a reasonableness analysis.”). 
 205 See Amended Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al., in Support of Appellants, 
Black Layman and Levi Sparks, supra note 148, at 12–13 (encouraging the State of Indiana to adopt a 
unique juvenile standard when a juvenile is charged with felony murder). 
 206 See id. at 13 (arguing that because youths are unlikely to anticipate or understand the risk that 
an individual could die during the commission of a felony, felony murder should not be applied to 
them). 
 207 See id. (“[T]he transferred intent theory which undergirds the modern felony murder doctrine 
cannot be squared with the settled behavioral and scientific research regarding children which has led 
the United States Supreme Court to abandon decades-old sentencing and police interrogation tactics 
where juveniles are involved.”). 
2020] Why the Eighth Amendment Bans Charging Juveniles with Felony Murder 2995 
Although Levick and Tierney’s reasoning has yet to succeed in court, 
Levick and the Juvenile Law Center raised this argument to the Indiana Su-
preme Court in an amicus brief submitted in 2015 in Layman v. State.208 The 
court ultimately decided the case on other grounds and did not address the ar-
gument made in the brief.209 The argument was credited, however, by a con-
curring opinion following the Indiana Court of Appeals’ review of the case.210 
C. The Original Meaning of the Constitution Prohibits Punishing  
Conduct in the Absence of Moral Culpability 
Another way to challenge the constitutionality of charging juveniles with 
felony murder stems from the Supreme Court’s precedent concerning culpabil-
ity.211 The history of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause suggests that 
the Constitution does not permit punishments that are offensively harsh when 
compared to the moral culpability of the offender.212 The English common law 
                                                                                                                           
 208 See Layman v. State, 42 N.E.3d 972, 979–80 (Ind. 2015) (holding that because the victim was 
killed by a third party, and not one of the accomplices, and because the co-perpetrators’ behavior was 
not violent or threatening such that their actions were the “mediate or immediate” cause of the vic-
tim’s death, the evidence was insufficient to support a felony murder conviction); Amended Brief of 
Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al., in Support of Appellants, Black Layman and Levi Sparks, 
supra note 148, at 22 (arguing that a juvenile who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill should 
not face a felony murder charge because the charge did not account for his diminished capacity). In 
Layman, the defendant, Blake Layman, and four co-defendants broke into the home of Rodney Scott. 
42 N.E.3d at 974. Layman and two other co-defendants were juveniles at the time of the crime. Id. All 
of the co-defendants were unarmed and specifically chose to break into Scott’s house because they 
believed he was not home. Id. Scott, however, was home and woke up when the boys kicked in his 
back door. Id. Scott went downstairs and fired shots at the intruders, killing one and injuring another. 
Id. Layman and the other juvenile defendants were convicted under a felony murder theory and sen-
tenced to fifty-five years in prison. Id. Layman appealed, challenging among other things the constitu-
tionality of the sentence for juveniles convicted of felony murder, the constitutionality of Indiana’s 
direct filing statute, and the constitutionality of a forty-five- to sixty-five-year sentence for reckless 
behavior. Id. at 975 n.2. 
 209 Layman, 42 N.E.3d at 980–81. The court declined to address the constitutional claims made by 
Layman, asserting that major revisions should be left to the legislature. Id. at 977–78. The court in-
stead distinguished Layman’s case from others that it had decided and held that the evidence present-
ed was insufficient to sustain a felony murder conviction, because the victim was killed by the third-
party homeowner and the co-defendants did not behave violently or threateningly. Id. at 979–80. 
 210 See id. at 968–69 (May, J., concurring) (expressing concern with holding juveniles to the same 
foreseeability requirement as adults, and arguing that precedent does not preclude the court from de-
ciding that juveniles should not be charged with felony murder when the victim is killed by a third 
party). 
 211 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 492 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that using transferred intent to 
satisfy the mens rea of felony murder would require “fallacious reasoning”). 
 212 Against Cruel Innovation, supra note 49. According to Professor John F. Stinneford, at the 
time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution, the term “unusual” meant “new” or “contrary to long 
usage.” Id. Therefore, a punishment is unusual if it is contrary to longstanding practice. Id. This in-
quiry confirms the existence of a proportionality requirement in the Eighth Amendment: if a punish-
ment is disproportionate when compared to the punishment typically imposed for the same crime, it 
violates the Eighth Amendment. Id.; see Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor John F. Stinneford in Sup-
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inspired the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.213 By the 1600s, English 
common-law courts had started to apply the principle of proportionality to 
criminal punishments.214 For example, in Hodges v. Humkin, a case decided in 
fifteenth-century England, the court granted relief to a man who had been im-
prisoned for insulting the local mayor.215 The court reasoned that confinement 
of an individual must be proportionate to the offense with which the individual 
was charged.216 The English Bill of Rights, enacted in 1689, banned excessive 
bail, excessive fines, and the infliction of “cruell and unusuall Punish-
ments.”217 English courts interpreted this clause to include the requirement that 
the punishment fit the crime and the clause, moreover, eventually inspired the 
Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.218 Throughout the development of 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the mental state of the defendant has always 
been a central focus of the Court in its evaluation of a punishment’s propor-
tionality to the underlying offense.219 
The Supreme Court has continued in modern times to consider the mental 
state of defendants when determining whether behavior should result in crimi-
                                                                                                                           
port of Neither Party at 8, Kahler v. Kansas, 139 S. Ct. 1318 (2019) (No. 18-6135), 2019 WL 2418947 
(noting that the origin of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause goes back to the Magna Carta, 
which stated that fines must be proportionate to the offense and served as inspiration for future laws 
and cultural norms). 
 213 See Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor John F. Stinneford in Support of Neither Party, supra 
note 212, at 16–17 (explaining that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amend-
ment is understood as an adoption of English common law). 
 214 Id. at 8. 
 215 Id. 
 216 See id. (stating that the Court of the King’s Bench held in Hodges that “imprisonment ought 
always to be according to the quality of the offence” (quoting Hodges v. Humkin, 80 Eng. Rep. 1016 
(1615))). 
 217 Id. at 11. The case of Titus Oates in 1685 illustrated the meaning of the clause. See id. at 11–
12 (citing Trial of Titus Oates, 10 How. St. Tr. 1079, 1314–15 (K.B. 1685)) (explaining that English 
Parliament determined based on the case of Titus Oates that the ban on cruel and unusual punishments 
included a ban on disproportionate punishments). There, a jury found Oates guilty of perjury and 
sentenced him to two whippings, life imprisonment, pillorying four times a year, a fine, and removal 
from the clergy. Id. Although the court upheld Oates’s sentence on appeal, representatives in the 
House of Commons expressed that such a sentence was precisely banned by the Bill of Rights. Id. at 
13. 
 218 See id. at 12 (noting that all of the representatives in the House of Lords found the punishment 
“extravagant” and “exorbitant”). Because all of the penalties inflicted on Oates, with the exception of 
removal from the clergy, were legal, one can infer that the representatives found the punishment to be 
disproportionate to Oates’s offense. See id. at 13 (reasoning that because the punishments were not 
illegal or barbaric, they must have been cruel and unusual given how disproportionate they were to the 
crime of insulting the mayor). 
 219 See Ely v. Thompson, 10 Ky. 70, 75 (1820) (holding that it was unconstitutional for the lower 
court to punish a defendant who had utilized the right to self-defense, even though the statute permit-
ted punishment, because the defendant was justified in using self-defense and therefore morally 
blameless); Brief Amicus Curiae of Professor John F. Stinneford in Support of Neither Party, supra 
note 212, at 21 (explaining that on the rare occasions where laws were passed that allowed for pun-
ishment without culpability, courts were quick to strike down the laws as unconstitutional). 
2020] Why the Eighth Amendment Bans Charging Juveniles with Felony Murder 2997 
nal liability.220 In Enmund v. Florida, the Court held that a defendant who did 
not kill or attempt to kill could not be sentenced to death because he did not 
possess the requisite moral culpability.221 In Tison v. Arizona, the Court limited 
the holding of Enmund, but still articulated that a defendant must show some 
recklessness and indifference in order to be sentenced to death under an ac-
complice felony murder theory.222 In Robinson v. California, when the Court 
considered whether a statute that criminalized the status of drug addiction was 
constitutional, it struck the statute down because it punished a condition for 
which defendants bore no moral responsibility.223 Finally, in 1968, in Powell v. 
Texas, the Court affirmed that individuals may not be punished for conditions 
they cannot control.224 With these cases in mind, how can a juvenile who did not 
kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill during the commission of a felony possess 
the requisite moral culpability to face criminal liability for felony murder?225 
The research on adolescent brain development that the Court endorses in 
Roper, Graham, and Miller demonstrates that juveniles are reckless, suscepti-
ble to peer pressure, and less able to assess the possible consequences of their 
actions.226 These characteristics are inherent to adolescents and are not within 
their control.227 Although the condition of being a juvenile in no way elimi-
nates culpability for all criminal behavior, it certainly reduces, if not elimi-
nates, culpability for crimes, like felony murder, that assign fault based on 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 158 (holding that the Eighth Amendment is not violated when an ac-
complice, who plays a key role in carrying out the underlying felony and displays a reckless indiffer-
ence to human life, is charged with felony murder and sentenced to death); Enmund v. Florida, 458 
U.S. 782, 801 (1982) (holding that when a co-defendant does not kill or attempt to kill, he cannot be 
sentenced to death even if he contemplated that death might occur). 
 221 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. 
 222 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 158 (“Rather, we simply hold that major participation in the felony 
committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund 
culpability requirement.”). Although Enmund suggested that it might be unconstitutional to charge a 
person who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill with murder, Tison significantly limited that 
holding by allowing co-defendants who show reckless indifference to human life to be charged with 
murder if a killing occurs during the commission of a felony. Id.; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801. 
 223 See supra notes 51–56 and accompanying text (explaining the background and reasoning for 
the Court’s decision in Robinson). 
 224 See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 567 (1968) (“Criminal penalties may not be inflicted upon 
a person for being in a condition he is powerless to change.”). 
 225 See Punishment Without Culpability, supra note 56, at 693 (explaining that the Constitution 
does contain a culpability requirement, although the Court has been hesitant to acknowledge it out-
right). 
 226 See supra notes 103–147 and accompanying text (outlining the Court’s decisions in Roper, 
Graham, and Miller, and the adolescent brain science that the decisions adopted). 
 227 See supra notes 103–147 and accompanying text (explaining the adolescent brain science 
credited by the Court to support the conclusion that the capacity of juveniles is diminished compared 
to the capacity of adults). 
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foreseeability.228 Charging juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend 
to kill with felony murder is unconstitutional because doing so assigns culpa-
bility for a condition over which juveniles lack control.229 
If the Court is unwilling to ban charging juveniles who did not kill, intend 
to kill, or attempt to kill with felony murder, it should at least establish a de-
fense for juveniles to account for their diminished culpability.230 The Court has 
frequently compared the diminished culpability of juveniles to the diminished 
culpability of individuals with mental illness and treated the groups in a similar 
manner, such as by abolishing the death penalty for both groups.231 Yet, whereas 
the insanity defense is available to the mentally ill, no such diminished culpabil-
ity defense is available to juveniles.232 If juveniles’ diminished culpability is not 
accounted for in the crimes they may be charged with, juveniles should at least 
have the opportunity to mount their diminished culpability as a defense.233 
III. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS: CAN THE SUPREME COURT STOP THE 
PRACTICE OF CHARGING JUVENILES WHO DID NOT KILL, ATTEMPT  
TO KILL, OR INTEND TO KILL WITH FELONY MURDER? 
Existing Supreme Court precedent provides multiple avenues for attacking 
the constitutionality of charging juveniles with felony murder; however, each ap-
proach has its respective strengths and weaknesses.234 Section A of this Part ex-
plores the benefits and drawbacks of challenging felony murder as applied to ju-
veniles through juvenile sentencing precedent and through J.D.B. v. North Caro-
                                                                                                                           
 228 See supra notes 135–140 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Breyer’s concurrence in 
Miller in which he argued that the culpability of juveniles who do not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to 
kill is significantly diminished). 
 229 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 491 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reasoning that the transferred intent used 
to justify the felony murder rule is not sufficient to serve as intent under the Eighth Amendment be-
cause, in Enmund, the Court ruled that transferred intent could not be relied upon to decide whether 
the death penalty was permissible for an adult). 
 230 See Sinclair v. State, 132 So. 581, 584 (Miss. 1931) (“It certainly would be cruel and unusual 
to punish a child of tender years, incapable of judging the consequences of its acts, should it, through 
misjudgment or otherwise, administer poison to another child or to another person. It would be equal-
ly cruel and equally as unusual to impose life imprisonment or death upon any person who did not 
have intelligence enough to know that the act was wrong or to know the consequences that would 
likely result from the act.”). 
 231 See id. at 559 (noting that the petitioner filed a state petition for post-conviction relief after the 
Supreme Court decided in Atkins v. Virginia to ban the death penalty for the mentally ill). The Court 
in Atkins determined that the reduced culpability of the mentally ill meant that the group could not be 
subjected to the harshest punishment available. 536 U.S. 304, 319 (2002). In Roper, the Court deter-
mined that the same conclusion applied to juveniles: their diminished culpability meant they could not 
face the harshest available sentence. 543 U.S. at 571. 
 232 See Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 526 (explaining that juveniles have no defense that 
takes into consideration their developmental differences). 
 233 Id. 
 234 See infra notes 237–271 and accompanying text. 
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lina’s reasonable juvenile standard.235 Section B of this Part asserts that the 
Eighth Amendment argument against charging juveniles who did not kill, attempt 
to kill, or intend to kill with felony murder has the greatest chance of success.236 
A. Challenging Felony Murder as Applied to Juveniles Through  
Juvenile Sentencing Precedent and J.D.B. v. North  
Carolina’s Reasonable Juvenile Standard 
Challenging the practice of charging juveniles who did not kill, intend to 
kill, or attempt to kill through the Supreme Court’s precedent on juvenile sen-
tencing is the most natural argument given the direction of the precedent, but it 
does not provide a direct challenge to the application of felony murder to juve-
niles.237 There are also additional weaknesses that come with attacking juve-
nile felony murder from this angle.238 First, supporters of the felony murder 
rule can argue that juveniles’ diminished culpability has already been account-
ed for through Miller v. Alabama.239 Because Miller banned mandatory life 
without parole, judges must take the circumstances of the offense, which could 
include a juvenile’s diminished culpability, into consideration before sentenc-
ing a juvenile to life without parole, making the argument that juveniles should 
not be sentenced to life without parole at all a tougher sell.240 
Second, the benefit of attacking juvenile felony murder from the sentenc-
ing perspective is reaching its logical end.241 After all, if discretionary life 
without parole is deemed unconstitutional for juveniles, states favoring harsh 
punishments can still sentence juveniles to extremely lengthy sentences and 
refuse to grant parole.242 This outcome is not particularly satisfying in light of 
                                                                                                                           
 235 See infra notes 237–257 and accompanying text. 
 236 See infra notes 258–271 and accompanying text. 
 237 See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 55–57 (2010) (explaining that the trial judge, who had the 
authority to sentence the defendant to as little as four years in prison, sentenced him to life without 
parole). 
 238 See Moore, supra note 154, at 126 (arguing that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing 
juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill to discretionary life without the possibility 
of parole). 
 239 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 489 (2012) (holding that mandatory life in prison with-
out the possibility of parole is not a permissible sentence for juveniles). 
 240 See id. (stating that by abolishing mandatory life without parole for juveniles, juveniles’ indi-
vidual circumstances can be considered by the sentencing judge). The respondents in Miller, Alabama 
and Arkansas, both argued that the abolition of mandatory life without parole was unnecessary be-
cause the personalized circumstances of juveniles are already considered when the prosecution de-
cides whether to charge them as an adult. Id. at 480. It is likely that a challenge to discretionary life 
without parole would be met with even greater opposition, given that individual circumstances are 
further considered in determining a sentence. See id. 
 241 See id. at 492 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that sentencing juveniles who did not kill, in-
tend to kill, or attempt to kill to life in prison is unconstitutional). 
 242 See Graham, 560 U.S. at 55–57 (explaining that the trial judge, who had the authority to sen-
tence the defendant to as little as four years in prison, sentenced him to life without parole). 
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what science shows about juveniles’ diminished culpability due to their imma-
turity, susceptibility to peer pressure, and capacity for reform, especially be-
cause it would not actually prohibit charging juveniles with felony murder.243 
Juveniles with diminished culpability who are convicted of felony murder 
could still spend a quarter or more of their lives in prison, where they would 
lose years essential for education, job training, and starting a family.244 Con-
tinuing to attack felony murder as applied to juveniles from the sentencing an-
gle will not yield the results juvenile justice advocates desire because juveniles 
could still unfairly face felony murder convictions and the lengthy sentences 
that accompany them.245 
Arguing that juveniles are entitled to a different reasonable person stand-
ard than adults is compelling because it exposes the ultimate contradiction be-
tween Supreme Court precedent on juveniles and the principle justifying the 
felony murder rule: felony murder is predicated on foreseeability, yet the Su-
preme Court has made explicit that juveniles cannot appreciate the conse-
quences of their actions to the same extent that adults can.246 The Court reiter-
ated in Miller, Graham v. Florida, and Roper v. Simmons that juveniles are 
different from adults and less capable of assessing consequences and risk.247 
Yet juveniles can be charged with felony murder, which is justified entirely on 
the rationale that perpetrators of dangerous felonies assume the risk of their 
actions.248 The Court has stated that this is precisely what juveniles are less 
capable of doing.249 Pointing out this contradiction through J.D.B. is compel-
                                                                                                                           
 243 See Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 525 (explaining that felony murder statutes, which 
are strict liability offenses, provide no opportunity for jurors to account for juveniles’ diminished 
culpability). 
 244 Felony Murder in Illinois, supra note 19. In addition to the individual repercussions of life 
without parole sentences for juveniles, there is also a significant financial cost to society. Rovner, 
supra note 107. It is estimated that if a juvenile serves fifty years starting at age sixteen, the total cost 
of incarceration will be around $2.25 million. Id. 
 245 Rovner, supra note 107. There are also significant racial disparities within juvenile life with-
out parole sentences. Id. According to Rovner, “[w]hile 23.2% of juvenile arrests for murder involve 
an African American suspected of killing a white person, 42.4% of [juvenile life without parole 
(JLWOP)] sentences are for an African American convicted of this crime. White juvenile offenders 
with African American victims are only about half as likely (3.6%) to receive a [JLWOP] sentence as 
their proportion of arrests for killing an African American (6.4%).” Id. 
 246 See Amended Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al., in Support of Appellants, 
Black Layman and Levi Sparks, supra note 148, at 8 (stating that Supreme Court precedent on juve-
nile justice and felony murder “cannot be squared”). 
 247 See supra notes 161–163 and accompanying text (explaining the brain science supporting the 
contention that juveniles have diminished capacity). 
 248 Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 525. 
 249 Graham, 560 U.S. at 82; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005); Levick & Tierney, 
supra note 147, at 525; see Miller, 567 U.S. at 492 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that felony mur-
der is justified by the idea that someone who decides to commit a dangerous felony should be aware 
that the victim could be killed, however, this “ability to consider the full consequences of a course of 
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ling because the Court in J.D.B. provided that a different standard must be 
used to account for the differences between children and adults in the context 
of custodial interrogations.250 
The weakness of applying the argument in J.D.B. to juvenile felony mur-
der is that it requires asking the Court to impose an entirely different type of 
remedy from what the Court did in J.D.B.251 There, the custody analysis al-
ready included a reasonable person standard.252 Without disrupting the custody 
analysis test significantly, the Court simply held that the reasonable person 
standard must consider juveniles’ age when they are interrogated.253 Felony 
murder statutes contain no reasonable person requirement; the rule is justified 
by the idea that death is reasonably foreseeable to the perpetrator, but the jury 
does not have to find that the death was reasonably foreseeable in order to 
convict.254 Without a reasonableness requirement built into the analysis, the 
Court cannot simply instruct juries to consider juveniles’ age in felony murder 
cases.255 Instead, the Court would have to come up with a substantially altered 
remedy, such as banning felony murder for juveniles who did not kill, intend to 
kill, or attempt to kill.256 It is possible that the Court would find the connection 
between J.D.B. too attenuated to justify this measure.257 
                                                                                                                           
action and to adjust one’s conduct accordingly is precisely what we know juveniles lack capacity to do 
effectively” (citing id. at 471–72 (majority opinion))). 
 250 Miller, 567 U.S. at 492 (Breyer, J., concurring); see J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 
262 (2011) (stating that “[a] child’s age is far ‘more than a chronological fact’” (quoting Eddings v. 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982))). 
 251 See Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 526 (noting that because the intent requirement for 
felony murder is so flawed, the Court will have a more difficult time finding a solution to account for 
juveniles’ immaturity when it comes to felony murder). 
 252 See J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 271 (pointing out that the custody analysis intentionally contains an 
objective reasonable person standard so that police will not be responsible for guessing on the idio-
syncrasies of different people). 
 253 Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 503; see J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 275 (holding that consider-
ing a child’s age during the Miranda custody analysis comports with the test’s objectivity require-
ment). 
 254 See supra note 74 and accompanying text (explaining that the jury must only find that the 
named victim was killed and that the defendant knowingly or willfully carried out the underlying 
felony). 
 255 Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 526; see Amended Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law 
Center et al., in Support of Appellants, Black Layman and Levi Sparks, supra note 148, at 13–14 
(suggesting possible remedies to the constitutional problem of charging juveniles with felony murder). 
 256 Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 526. 
 257 See Amended Brief of Amici Curiae Juvenile Law Center et al., in Support of Appellants, 
Black Layman and Levi Sparks, supra note 148, at 13–14 (outlining possible remedies to the constitu-
tional problem of charging juveniles with felony murder). 
3002 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2965 
B. Charging Juveniles Who Did Not Kill, Attempt to Kill, or Intend to Kill 
with Felony Murder Is Unconstitutional Because the Eighth  
Amendment Prohibits Punishment Without Fault 
The argument that applying felony murder to juveniles violates the culpa-
bility requirement of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is more likely 
to succeed.258 Charging juveniles who did not kill, intend to kill, or attempt to 
kill with felony murder violates the Eighth Amendment’s requirement that ac-
tors must have some culpability if their behavior is to be labeled criminal.259 
Because the Court has recognized that juveniles are inherently reckless and 
susceptible to peer pressure, it makes little sense to impose criminal liability on 
juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill for failing to foresee 
the possibility that a death might occur during a felony.260 Just as the statute in 
Robinson v. California punished addicts for their addiction, the felony murder 
doctrine punishes juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or intend to kill for 
characteristics that are not directly within their control—it punishes juveniles 
for outcomes for which they cannot logically be assigned blame.261 
Further, the Eighth Amendment provides the opportunity for the mentally 
ill, a group that the Court has often treated similarly to juveniles, to demon-
strate their diminished culpability through the insanity defense.262 Accordingly, 
juveniles must be afforded an opportunity to demonstrate their diminished cul-
pability before guilt or innocence is determined, not just during the sentencing 
phase.263 Because the felony murder rule does not require the jury to find an 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 491–92 (Breyer, J., concurring) (reasoning that the transferred intent 
used to justify the felony murder rule is not sufficient to serve as intent under the Eighth Amendment 
because in Enmund v. Florida the Court ruled that transferred intent cannot be relied upon to decide 
when the death penalty is permissible for an adult). 
 259 See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding that the government cannot 
impose criminal liability for being a drug addict). 
 260 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 492 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that juveniles are less likely to 
assess the possible consequences of their actions and decide not to follow through with them if there’s 
a chance their actions could result in negative outcomes). 
 261 Id. at 489 (majority opinion); see Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666 (reasoning that any punishment in 
the absence of fault is cruel and unusual). 
 262 See Kahler v. Kansas, 140 S. Ct. 1021, 1037 (2020) (observing that for hundreds of years, 
courts have recognized that insane individuals cannot be held responsible for crimes); Levick & Tier-
ney, supra note 147, at 526 (explaining that juveniles have no defense that takes into consideration 
their developmental differences). Although in Kahler v. Kansas the Court “decline[d] to require that 
Kansas adopt an insanity test turning on a defendant’s ability to recognize that his crime was morally 
wrong,” it did so because it found that Kansas’s approach still took into consideration a defendant’s 
mental health at “both trial and sentencing.” Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1037. 
 263 See Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1030 (relying on the authority of English jurist Henry de Bracton, 
who “thought that a ‘madman’ could no sooner be found criminally liable than a child,” to assert the 
longstanding existence of an insanity defense (quoting 2 BRACTON ON LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENG-
LAND 384 (G. Woodbine ed., S. Thorne trans., 1968))). In the mid-thirteen century, Henry de Bracton 
wrote “[f]or take away the will and every act will be indifferent because your state of mind gives 
meaning to your act, and a crime is not committed unless the intent to injure intervene, nor is a theft 
2020] Why the Eighth Amendment Bans Charging Juveniles with Felony Murder 3003 
intent to kill, defendants cannot attempt to negate the intent requirement.264 
This is unconstitutional in the case of juveniles because it makes fruitless any 
attempt, through a juvenile’s own testimony or that of an expert, to show a jury 
that the juvenile could not have assumed the risk of death when deciding to 
commit a felony.265 
Although the Court has refrained from expanding the Eighth Amendment 
culpability requirement, banning juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or 
intend to kill from being charged with felony murder may still appeal to the 
Court for several reasons.266 First, juveniles involved in dangerous felonies 
that result in deaths can still face lengthy sentences if they are found guilty of 
the underlying felony charge or a lesser degree of murder.267 Eliminating felo-
ny murder for juveniles will not allow juveniles who commit crimes to avoid 
punishment, but it will ensure that they are punished in proportion to their cul-
pability.268 Additionally, the Court would cause less disruption to its estab-
lished precedent if it abolished felony murder in some situations for juveniles 
based on their diminished culpability.269 If the Court decided that the Constitu-
tion prohibits punishment in the absence of culpability in all circumstances, 
states’ ability to impose felony murder on adults and to create strict liability 
crimes would be seriously undermined.270 Because this argument would end 
felony murder for juveniles with the least disruption to Court precedent, it has 
the strongest chance of success.271 
                                                                                                                           
committed except with the intent to steal.” THE PSYCHIATRIST IN THE COURTROOM: SELECTED PA-
PERS OF BERNARD L. DIAMOND, M.D. at xxx (Jacques M. Quen ed., 1994).  
 264 See Levick & Tierney, supra note 147, at 526 (explaining that “creative solutions” will be 
necessary to recognize juveniles’ diminished culpability in felony murder trials). 
 265 See id. (noting that one possible solution would be to eliminate the irrebuttable presumption in 
felony murder cases that the defendant possessed the intent to kill). 
 266 See id. (“To subject young defendants to an adult reasonableness standard in the felony mur-
der context fails to account adequately for their actual level of culpability. As such, strict application 
of the felony murder doctrine to juvenile defendants ignores key holdings of Roper, Graham, and 
J.D.B.”). 
 267 See Moore, supra note 154, at 126 (arguing that life without parole should be banned for juve-
niles, which would leave life with parole as the harshest possible sentence). If a person is sentenced to 
life with parole, he or she will have the opportunity to appear before the parole board fifteen to fifty 
years after they are sentenced, depending on the state statute. Beth Schwartzapfel, Nine Things You 
Probably Didn’t Know About Parole, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (July 10, 2015), https://www.the
marshallproject.org/2015/07/10/nine-things-you-probably-didn-t-know-about-parole [https://perma.
cc/5LU8-79NN]. 
 268 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 493 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that if Kuntrell Jackson, who 
was serving life without parole for felony murder, did not intend to murder the victim who was killed 
by his accomplices, then he could not receive the harshest sentence available for juveniles). 
 269 See id. at 491–92 (pointing out the conflict within the Court’s precedent that arises when juve-
niles are charged with felony murder, suggesting that the practice cannot continue without threatening 
the legitimacy of the entire felony murder doctrine). 
 270 Id. 
 271 See id. at 490 (arguing that juveniles who do not kill or intend to kill have twice diminished 
culpability). 
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CONCLUSION 
Recent Supreme Court precedent on juvenile justice has made it difficult 
to defend the constitutionality of charging juveniles who did not kill, attempt 
to kill, or intend to kill with felony murder. The felony murder rule is justified 
by the idea that some felonies are so dangerous that the possibility of death 
should be reasonably foreseeable to the perpetrator. The Supreme Court has 
made clear that juveniles’ immaturity and impulsivity make it difficult for 
them to understand the possible consequences of their actions. Therefore, as 
Justice Stephen Breyer explained in his concurrence in Miller v. Alabama, as-
signing criminal liability via felony murder to juveniles who did not kill, at-
tempt to kill, or intend to kill is based on “fallacious reasoning.”272 The incon-
sistencies in precedent on the felony murder doctrine and on juvenile justice 
are readily identifiable, making it possible to develop a well-supported legal 
argument demonstrating that such inconsistencies are unconstitutional. Be-
cause the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause re-
quires that criminal liability only be imposed in the presence of moral culpabil-
ity, it is unconstitutional to charge juveniles who did not kill, attempt to kill, or 
intend to kill with felony murder. 
Despite the promising nature of the arguments, the makeup of the current 
Supreme Court makes it uncertain that any argument will succeed in the near 
future.273 In his dissent in Miller, Justice Clarence Thomas expressed his dis-
dain for combining two lines of Supreme Court precedent to reach a result that 
he believed had no foundation.274 Today, Justice Thomas might have the neces-
sary support to form a majority.275 Three of the five Justices who formed the 
majority in Miller remain on the Court today, and two of those Justices ex-
pressed in a concurring opinion their desire for the Court to further 
                                                                                                                           
 272 Id. at 489. 
 273 See Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1037 (holding that Kansas did not violate the Eighth Amendment by 
abandoning a definition of the insanity defense that stated that individuals must understand that their 
actions are morally wrong in order to be held criminally liable). The Supreme Court decided Kahler 
on March 23, 2020. Id. The Kahler ruling, which pertained to the insanity defense and not juvenile 
culpability, provides insight into the Court’s current outlook on the constitutional requirements for 
mens rea. Id. The decision did not contain anything explicitly at odds with the argument that juveniles 
who did not kill, intend to kill, or attempt to kill cannot form the necessary criminal intent to be 
charged with felony murder; however, the ruling displayed great deference to states on the topic of 
mens rea. See id. (holding that enabling defendants to negate the mens rea of a crime sufficiently ac-
counted for the diminished capacity of the mentally ill). The Court was satisfied by the many ways 
that the diminished culpability of the mentally ill could be accounted for absent a constitutional stand-
ard. Id. 
 274 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 502 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that in addition to misunderstand-
ing the original meaning of the Constitution for two lines of precedent, the Court “compounds its 
errors by combining these lines of precedent and extending them to reach a result that is even less 
legitimate than the foundation on which it is built”). 
 275 Kahler, 140 S. Ct. at 1037. 
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acknowledge the diminished culpability of juveniles.276 It is possible that if 
two other, typically more conservative Justices were persuaded to abolish the 
practice of charging juveniles with felony murder in light of the originalist jus-
tifications for reevaluating the Constitution’s culpability requirement, the bla-
tant contradiction between the Court’s existing precedent on juveniles’ dimin-
ished culpability and the justification for the felony murder rule would finally 
be resolved.277 
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 276 Miller, 567 U.S. at 463. Justice Elena Kagan delivered the majority opinion, which was joined 
by Justices Anthony Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor. Id. Jus-
tice Breyer filed a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Sotomayor, expressing a desire 
that the Court further acknowledge the diminished culpability of juveniles. Id. at 493–502 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan remain on the Court today, as do Justices Rob-
erts, Thomas, and Alito, who dissented in Miller. Justices, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/justices 
[https://perma.cc/P99G-FKWU]. Justices Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined the Court since the 
Miller decision as President Donald Trump appointees. Id. 
 277 See supra notes 195–210 and accompanying text (describing why the justification for charging 
juveniles with felony murder is completely at odds with Supreme Court jurisprudence on juveniles’ 
diminished culpability); supra notes 211–219 and accompanying text (outlining an originalist inter-
pretation of the Constitution that concludes that the Constitution requires punishments to be propor-
tionate to an offender’s moral culpability). 
 
 
 
 
